Transferable property rights to water: the New Zealand experience. by Allison, Nicholas J
TRANSFERABLE 
PROPER TY RIGHTS 
TO WATER 
THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE 
Nicholas J Allison 
~ 
February 1988 
Final Report to Treasury 
and partial fulfillment for an 
M.S.C Resource Management 
1HES\S 
1 
ABSTRACT 
The report has been designed as a small input into the present review of the resource 
use statutes. As conflict between competing or potentially competing users of water 
has become more common, there is a need to review the manner in which we 
allocate water resources in New Zealand. An alternative resource allocation 
mechanism to the present administrative system is a market mechanism. The report 
examines theoretical literature on transferable property rights to water and the 
actual experience New Zealand has had with a water market. Drawn from the 
analysis are several policy recommendations on the fonn of the institutional 
structure a water market could take in New Zealand. 
The views expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the New Zealand Treasury. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
There is increasing conflict and competition among water user groups in 
New Zealand. Conflict between competing or potentially competing users of water 
has now become common. 1 The problem is likely to get worse. While the demand 
for water will probably increase, its supply is limited. Moreover changing social and 
economic conditions are likely to make the reallocation of water rights desirable. In 
several areas of New Zealand the availability of water has now become an effective 
constraillt to development.2 
At present the reallocation of water among competing uses can only be achieved by 
regional water boards not reissuing water rights when they expire or, where possible, 
by the cancellation of existing rights. In neither situation are water right holders 
compensated.3 In order to achieve greater flexibility in the management of water 
resources regional water boards, ill recent years, have tended to grant water rights 
for shorter terms and subject to stricter conditions. 4 In areas where water has 
become a major constraint on development, shorter water right terms and stricter 
conditions on rights may possibly lead to uncertainty over future supply. TI1is in tum 
would be a disillcentive to illvest ill productive activities dependent on long term 
access to water. 
Milne, Philip J. Water Resource Allocation and Management ;n New Zealand: Recent 
Developments, ;n New Zealand Universities Law Review 11 (3) : 245-271, P.245, 1985. 
2 A good example is the Waimea Plains where a moratorium on further water extraction has 
been put in place. [Hawkes Bay, South Auckland. Bay of Plenty, Canterbury and Otago 
are all areas in which water rationing now occursJ 
3 Hide, Rodney and Sharp, Basil. Piecemeal Reform of Water Resource Institutions Paper 
to the New Zealand Association of Sail Conservators Conference, P3, May 1987. 
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In addition to problems of inflexibility and possible uncertainty over future supply, 
the existing allocation mechanism does not signal the value of the resource to 
present and potential users. Where conflict exists over the supply of water, the 
Planning Tribunal and Water Boards make the necessary allocation decisions. The 
primary criterion on which such decisions are based is "beneficial use" - how the 
costs and benefits of water allocation can and should be distributed among 
competing interests. To a large degree these decisions involve explicit value 
judgments. 5 In the absence of a mechanism which indicates the value of water 
resources it is difficult, if not impossible, 10 make an impartial and accurate 
assessment of how costs and benefits will be distributed. 
Problems of inflexibility and increasing conflict have led several authors to suggest 
tradeable property rights as a mechanism for allocating water. Water-right holders 
would have an incentive to take account of the value placed on their resource by 
others. Users would be motivated to use the resource more efficiently because they 
would face an opportunity cost of water use as their water rights could be sold. Thus 
water right holders would have an incentive to conserve water through the use of 
more efficient technology. A market for water would encourage flexibility as new 
and highly valued users could be quickly accommodated by the exchange of water 
rights. Since prices would signal the value of changes in water abstraction, 
information useful to deciding instream flows for recreation and conservation 
purposes would be provided. Prices would also indicate the value of using water for 
waste disposal. In sum, tradeable water rights are viewed as potentially more 
efficient, responsive and flexible than the existing system of water allocation.6 
4 Terms of five to ten years are common. See Milne P g. 265. 
5 Milne, Philip J. Pg. 246 - 247 
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1.2 Study Objectives 
The only sensible reason for suggesting New Zealand should adopt a system of 
transferable water rights is that such a move will make us better off. That is 
transferable rights will reduce conflict, conserve water and lead to a more equitable 
allocation of water. Overseas experience suggests voluntary transfers of water will 
indeed lead to more efficient water use. For example the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California (MWD) has offered the Imperial Irrigation District 
$10 million per year to fund water conservation measures that would salvage 100,000 
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acre feet of water annually for use by MWD. However., what works well overseas 
may not necessarily work for New Zealand. 
Fortunately, New Zealand has had over a century of experience with a water market 
in Central Otago8 between 1858 and 1971. This anomaly in New Zealand's history 
of water management arose because mining privileges granted under mining acts 
made provision for private transferable water rights. Deemed as chattel interests, 
they were subsequently sold to farmers for irrigation. This experience with water 
markets presents us with an opportunity to learn, first hand, about their likely 
consequences. Such an understanding can be used to enable better design of policy 
reforms aimed at facilitating trade in water. 
This study will examine: 
The structure of the property rights to water under the mining privilege system. 
6 Hide, Rodney and Sharp, Bas.il Piecemeal Reform of Water Institutions Paper to the New 
Zealand Association of Soil Conservators Conference 1987. 
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The transaction costs and externalities associated with transfers. 
How the information generated by the Otago experience can be used in the 
design and implementation of water markets in New Zealand. 
1. 3 Study Outline 
There are four sections to the report. It proceeds with a brief account of 
contemporary economic theory of transferable property rights to water. This 
theoretical framework, in conjuction with an outline of the property right 
arrangements to water under the mining privilege system, is used to predict the 
nature of externalities and transactions costs associated with mining privilege water 
transfers. Evidence is sought to support or refute these predictions. An extensive 
appendix contains a detailed account of the operation and property right 
arrangements of the mining privilege system of allocating water. The final section 
examines the administrative and other property arrangements required to introduce 
transferable water rights in New Zealand. Particular emphasis is given to how we 
can learn from the Otago experience by the design of property rights arrangements 
which would avoid the shortcomings of mining privilege system of water transfers. 
7 Envi ronment Commi ttee Group on Natural Resource Management. Use of Water Ri ghts: 
Recent United States Developments in Water Market. Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. ENV/NRM/87.7, 1987. 
8 Since the opportunity for trade in water arose out of mining privileges, granted under 
mining acts, it is possible trade ;n water rights would have taken place elsewhere in 
the country. Otago,howeve~with its early concentration of mining and arid conditions 
offers the best example. 
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2.0 WATER RIGHT TRANSFERS: CONTEMPORARY TIIEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
Trade is likely to occur where individuals place different values on a resource, the 
resource has a scarcity value and the gains from trade are not outweighed by large 
transaction costs. Trade is a transfer of rights. In order to be transferable a right 
must be clearly delimited and enforced. If a right is unenforced, it is effectively no 
right at all. As trade allows resources to gravitate towards users who place the 
highest value on them, the aggregate value obtained from using resources can 
increase. However, if trade is to increase the aggregate value of resource use for 
society, rights have to be specified in a way which ensures actors internalise costs. 
Costs not internalised are negative externalities. Where negative externalities occur 
others bear additional costs, hence the transfer of resources to users who place a 
high value on them will not necessarily increase the aggregate value of the resource 
use to society. 
The need to enforce rights, and to specify rights in a manner which internalises 
externalities in order to ensure trade results in increased aggregate value, means 
that transaction costs could be quite substantia1.9 The larger are transaction costs, 
the smaller the gains from trade, and thus the less likely it is that trade will occur. 
The analysis below emphasises how property rights to water can be specified in a 
manner which internalises costs and benefits, minimises costs of specification and 
enforcement, and thus ensures transaction costs are kept to a minimum. 
The analysis proceeds by considering two different ways in which water can be 
rationed to accommodate variability - the doctrine of equal sharing and the doctrine 
9 Randall. A. 1975, Property Rights and Social Micro-Economics Natural Resource Journal, 
15: 729-738. 
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of prior appropriation. How rights can be defined to avoid third party impainnent, 
and thus facilitate trade, is then examined. Next, the circumstances under which a 
market allocation of a water resource will deviate from the traditional economic 
efficiency condition, Le. the productive value of the resource use at the margin is 
equal across all users, is investigated. Of particular importance, with respect to the 
ff' , d't" h 't ' ht 10 e lclency con 1 Ions, IS ow IDS ream ng s affect the transferability of 
consumptive rights, The analysis focuses on how property rights to water can be 
delimited in order to minimise transaction costs. 
2.2 Doctrine of Prior Appropriation 
The doctrine of prior appropriation is a means of accommodating the inter-temporal 
variability of water resources. Rights are specified in tenns of the quantity taken, 
the purpose of use and the point of diversion. The temporal priority of a right is 
established by the date of filing the application to appropriate water. In times when 
the river flow is inadequate to meet the requirements of all rights, the earliest 
priorities are entitled to water before later priorities. Junior right holders have to 
cease or lower their rate of extraction in order that senior appropriators" rights can 
be fully met. 
An alternative to temporal priority would be to delimit rights on the basis of flow 
rates. Low priority rights would be those that were shed as river flows fell below 
critical levels. However, delimiting rights on the basis of flow rates would impose 
an additional enforcement cost: monitoring river flows. Where rights are based on 
temporal priority, the major enforcement cost is that of ensuring appropriators take 
only their entitlement. In contrast, if flow rates were used to delimit rights,> in 
addition to the need to enforce the quantities diverted by individual appropriators, 
10 Instream rights pertain to non-comsumptive water rights. For example, water for 
fishing or other recreational purposes. 
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river flows would have to be measured and constantly monitored. In comparison to 
delimiting right on the basis of flow rates, a system which uses temporal priority has 
lower enforcement costs. 
Although a system of rights based an temporal priority has lower enforcement costs 
in comparison to a system which delimits rights on the basis of flow rates, it does 
not necessarily follow that it will have a lower transaction cost. To evaluate the 
affect the two different ways of specifying rights have on transaction costs, their 
effect on certainty has to be examined. As certainty decreases, greater costs are 
imposed an individuals in terms of risk and the likelihood of conflict. Where the 
boundaries between individuals rights are unclear, individual actions carry a greater 
risk of infringing other rights and hence producing conflict. Greater risk is also 
likely to encourage individuals to make more conservative resource use decisions and 
thus lower the value of a resource at any given point in time. A system of property 
rights which minimises uncertainty also helps to minimise transaction costs. 
Because the margin for error in measuring river flows may be substantial, a system 
of rights based on flow rates could generate additional risk and conflict in 
comparison to system based on temporal priority. Where temporal priority is used to 
delimit rights the common boundary between rights is time. In contrast to time, the 
measure of river flow rates leaves a considerable margin for error. Such a margin 
would increase the risk underpinning individual appropriators decisions and, where 
errors occurred?conflict between appropriators may result. Since a system based on 
measuring flow rates is, at the very best, not likely to change the certainty 
surrounding rights and carries the added enforcement cost of monitoring river flow 
rates, it will entail a larger transaction cost in comparison to a system based on 
temporal priority. 
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2.3 Doctrine of Equal Sharing 
The doctrine of equal sharing is another means of allocating property rights in order 
to deal with the problem of variable flows. Under a pure doctrine of equal sharing, 
if the flow falls below the volume required to supply all water rights, water deficits 
are shared equally among appropriators. New Zealand Water Boards have generally 
adopted the doctrine of equal sharing in an attempt to distribute hardships caused by 
low flows equally among and within user groups.ll They have generally opted for 
water allocation plans which require particular groups of users to share water 
deficits among members and,at certain critical flows,to stop abstraction altogether. 
As argued above, a major specification cost of systems which delimit boundaries 
between rights on the basis of flow rates is monitoring. This can clearly be seen in 
the case of Hawkes Bay. The Catchment Board is involved in the weekly monitoring 
of flow rates and the computation of the reductions individual appropriators have to 
make to accommodate water deficits. Because reductions are made on a 
proportionate basis relative to the size of the right, and depend on variable stream 
flows and the number of appropriators actually using their rights, individual right 
holders are not always in a position to calculate the necessary reductions in 
abstraction themselves. Thus, in times of water deficits, the Hawkes Bay Catchment 
Board is involved in the weekly monitoring of flows and the revision of individual 
11 This approach has been interpreted as being consistent with the multi-purpose intent 
of the Water and Soi 1 Conserva t i on Act 1967. Withi n the most common user group, 
farmers, local irrigation committees are sometimes used to ration water among 
members. Attempts by water boards to share hardship equally among users has led to 
conditions being placed on 1 icences. These specify times and rates of extraction, 
dependent on flow rates. For an overview of how water boards ration flows see Wallace 
P. K. The Flexibility of Water Resource Management Thesis, Masters in Resource 
Management Canterbury and Lincoln College. For a regional example of this form of 
rationing see Catchcart, R. W. et al. 1983. Rakaia River Catchment and Central Plains 
- Draft. Management Pl an North Canterbury Catchment Board and Reg; ona 1 Water Board. 
Christchurch. 
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appropriators abstraction rates. 12 Attempts to distribute hardships caused by low 
flows equally amoung groups in New Zealand has created a substantial monitoring 
role for Water Boards. 
Two water allocation plans., one based on prior appropriation and one the based on 
sharing hardships, can be found in appendix four. The Opihi River allocation plan 
involves six different user groups who come under various obligations dependent on 
flow rates and the conditions attached to their licences. Clearly, at the very least, 
this involves the board in monitoring of flow rates. In contrast, the prior 
appropriation plan for the Lindis River is a simple priority listing. The water holders 
look after monitoring and enforcement themselves. 
In contrast to prior appropriation, equal sharing provides an incentive to ensure 
water resources are under-used. Along a stream where summer time flows are fully 
appropriated every new right issued could potentially have a negative impact on 
existing rights. Holders of existing rights are thus encouraged to object to water 
right applications.13 Water authorities, where possible, will respond by tightly 
defining the time,place and rate of extraction to satisfy objectors. Alternatively, 
the application for the right will be refused. In contrast, under prior appropriation, 
the maxim of t first-in-first served', ensures that the issue of additional rights will 
not reduce flows available to existing rights. Right holders cannot object on grounds 
of a diminished supply of water. Expensive and time consuming hearings over water 
right applications can thus be avoided and peak as well as low flows fully used. 
In addition to the transaction costs incurred through objections to the granting of 
rights and the monitoring of flow regimes, equal sharing generates added 
enforcement costs. When flows are inadequate to supply all rights the reduction in 
12 per com Ian Kenyes Hawkes Bay Catchment Board 
13 Indeed a cursury survey I made of objections to the granting of new water rights 
indicated the threat of a diminised water supply is a common basis for objections. 
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abstraction has to be enforced over all rights. In contrast, lIDder prior appropriation, 
the reduction in abstraction, except in exceptional circumstances, need only be 
enforced over junior right holders. It is relatively easy to observe whether a few 
junior rights have stopped abstraction in comparison to evaluating whether or not all 
rights have reduced abstraction by a given percentage.14 
The reader may object that where a water market exists an allocation of rights 
based on prior appropriation would gravitate to the same allocation which exists 
under equal sharing. That is in a perfectly competitive market, assuming n identical 
firms, each appropriator would purchase a lin share of each water right. However 
this is a highly unlikely outcome. It is unlikely firms will be identical an~as will be 
evident further in the analysis, the transaction cost involved in transfers of water 
may be considerable. To achieve equal sharing (n-1) 2 transactions would be 
necessary. Where n is large .. the cost of transactions of each lin share is likely to 
exceed the gains from trade. Further, as the allocation approaches equal sharing, 
enforcement costs increase. 
2.4 Water Transfers: Property Right Specification 
In order to make the analysis more conducive to readers not familiar with the 
economic theory of transferable water rights an illustrative example of water 
transfers is used. In figure 1, on page 11, a segment of stream is pictured along 
which four water abstractors, (1) to (4), are located. In serial order each user 
extracts a total of 200, 200, 150 and 50 lIDitS of water respectively. Their return 
flow coefficients are represented by the letter R where 0 < R <1. These 
14 A given volume of water will, depending on the irrigation method used. generally 
i rri gate a set area of 1 and. Thus ins ituat ions where meteri n9 devi ces are not used, 
appropriators can fairly readily observe if individuals are taking substantially more 
than their quota. However, small reductions in abstraction rates enforced by equal 
sharing may be hard to detect without the use of expensive metering devices. 
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coefficients are listed in the figure beside the quantities diverted. By multiplying 
the quantity diverted by (l-Rl., each abstractors consumptive use can be determined. 
At the head of the stream 450 units of water are available for diversion. In 
aggregate the four users divert 625 units of water, 175 units over and above that 
which was initially available. This is possible because water is used and reused as it 
moves dOVVIl the stream. 
It is not hard to conceive of ways in which things could go wrong when rights are 
specified only in terms of diversion. Consider a transfer of 100 units of water, half 
of (2) I S water right, from (2) to (1). Since (1) I S return flow coefficient, R = 0.0, is 
lower than (2) I s, R 0.5, aggregate consumption must increase. The increase is at 
the expense of users (3) and (4) who depend on (2)' s return flow. In fact, where 
property rights to water are defined on the basis of diversion, transfers along a fully 
appropriated river will cause third party impairment whenever they alter the ratio 
between consumptive use and diversion. 15 These externalities could be avoided if 
entitlements to return flows had been defined explicitly. However) in a world of 
positive transaction costs,defining numerous rights to return flows is impractical. 
15 For a more thorough discussion on consumptive use rights see Gisser & John, 
Institutional Restrictions on the Transfer of Water Rights and the Survival of an 
Agency in Water Rights, Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and the Environment 
ed. Terry L. Anderson Ballinger Publishing Company 1983. 
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Figure One: 
(2) ts 200 units DIver 
)' 
/ 
,/ 
R = 0.5 100 
Return fl~wn 100 units \ 
Consumptlo " 
tz '~ 
1;. (4) Diverts 50 
R = 0.5 25 
Return fl~.wn 25 units Con sump 10 
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(3) 'ts Diverts 150 urn 
R - 0.5 75 
Return flto'~n 75 units Consump 1 
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If rights were defined in tenns of consumption, the third party impainnent described 
above would be overcome without the need to define numerous entitlements to 
return flows. Consider again the transfer of 100 units of water from (2) to (1). 
V\1here rights are defined in tenns of consumptive use the transfer would result in (2) 
relinquishing any right to divert water. To see this recall (2)'s return flow 
coefficient is 0.5 hence of the 200 units diverted 100 are returned for use by other 
users and 100 are consumed by (2). In this case, since the transfer does not result in 
a change in aggregate consumption third party impainnent of those relying on the 
return flows of (2) does not occur. 
However, defining rights on the basis of consumptive use merely lowers the risk that 
transfers will generate externalities. This is because of the spatial distribution of 
the resource. Consider a transfer of 50 consumptive units from (3) to (1). This 
transfer would create a binding constraint at user (2)' s point of diversion. That is, 
the streams flow would now only be sufficient at (2) to supply (2)' s diversion 
requirement. It would no longer be possible for (2) to buy water from a downstream 
user or for downstream users to supply to points above (2). The potential for 
transfers to produce negative externalities;6 either through the violation of third 
party rights or the impainnent of others I ability to trade, calls for restrictions on 
the free transferability of water rights. 17 
2.5 Water Transfers: Efficiency Conditions 
It has been shown that,provided transfers are delimited on the basis of consumptive 
use, third party impaimlent cannot be produced via changes in consumption diversion 
16 It should be al so noted transfers could produce posi tive external Hies by releasing 
binding constraints. 
17 It can be argued that, provided there are appropriate liability rules, water markets 
need not be regulated and it can then be left up to the Courts to decide if transfers 
have violated others rights. This proposition will be explored later in the report. 
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ratios. However, externalities can be produced by the creation of binding flow 
constraints which restrict others ability to trade. The creation of binding flow 
constraints could be important where regular seasonal exchanges of water occur. 
For the moment we assume that transfers are defined on the basis of consumptive 
use and trade will not produce binding flow constraints. This would be likely to be 
the case along streams which are, as yet, not fully appropriated. Under such 
circumstances the traditional micro-economic equilibrium condition for efficient 
resource allocation can be approached. In the context of a water market\it is where 
the net marginal product of consumptive use is equal across all appropriators. A 
mathematical proof of this proposition is found in appendix six. 
The efficiency condition has, however, been derived at the expense of a crucial 
assumption - that transfers do not produce binding flow constraints. Where 
appropriator I s flow constraints become binding the transferability of water rights is 
reduced. Hence, even where opportunities exist for trade, as marginal products of 
resource use differ across users, trade may be prevented. In this case a system of 
transferable water rights could not be expected to approach traditional 
micro-economic efficiency conditions: that the marginal product of resource use is 
equal across all users. 18 Rather, optimal efficiency conditions will be constrainted 
within the limits placed on transfers produced by binding flow constraints. 
2.6 Water Transfers: Prior Appropriation 
Under prior appropriation when the water supply is insufficient to meet the needs of 
all water right holders, senior appropriators may ask junior water right holders to 
cease or reduce their withdrawals. This action would violate the efficiency 
18 For a more complete discussion on the efficiency conditions regarding water transfers 
see Hartman L. M. and Seas tone D. A. Efficiency Criteria for Market Transfers of Water 
in Water Resources Research Vol. 1 No.2, 106-111. 
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condition, that the net marginal product of consumptive use is equal across all 
appropriators. The conventional rebuttal to this possibility is that junior right 
holders could restore marginal equality conditions by leasing water from senior right 
holders. It has been suggested, that if.,because of drought conditions,flow constraints 
become binding,it may not be possible to restore marginal equalities through water 
leasing. 19 However, it should be noted that under prior appropriation,prices will be 
risk adjusted to reflect the reliability of supply. In a market context, the effect of 
drought conditions and location on the supply of water will be accomodated in the 
price paid for different rights. Provided prices are risk adjusted,drought conditions 
d ' 1 ff" d't' 20 nee not VIO ate e lClency con 1 Ions. 
Burness and Quirk (1980) argue that where market transfer of water is restricted, 
the doctrine of prior appropriation will create additional inefficiencies in comparison 
to the doctrine of equal sharing. This is a consequence of unequal risk sharing among 
appropriators. They propose that since senior appropriators face more desirable 
probability distributions over stream flows they will tend to divert more water and 
build larger diversion capacities vis-a-vis junior appropriators. In order to abstract 
from diversion costs, Burness and Quirk assmne these to be sunk and thus they need 
only consider revenue. They assume that the marginal productivity of water use is 
decreasing. Since, at capacity and during times of low flow, the senior appropriator 
will divert more water than the junior appropriator, the senior appropriator's 
marginal revenue will always be less than that of the junior appropriators. 
Aggregate revenue could be increased if the marginal productivity of water use was 
equal across both appropriators. This would be possible if river flow was divided 
equally among the users as it would be under the doctrine of equal 
19 Johnson et al. 1981. The Definition of a Surface Water Right and Transferability 
Journal of Law and Economics 26: 273 P282. 
20 per com John Wilkinson 
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sharing. Thus where transfers are restricted, the doctrine of prior appropriation 
dd" al' ff" . 21 creates a Ihon me lClencles. 
2.7 Water Transfers: Instream Rights 
Instream rights are non-consumptive use rights to instream flows. These can 
potentially reduce the transferability of traditional consumptive rights. An example 
of such a right is the provision of water for anglers. To see how instream rights can 
reduce the transferability of traditional rights.,imagine the provision of an instream 
right to 250 units of water between user (1) and user (2) in figure one. This creates a 
binding constraint at diversion point (1). In fact)any transfers from a point below the 
instream right to a point above the instream right will now impair the instream flow 
right. Hence, the introduction of an instream right reduces the transferability of 
existing rights. 
The effect of instream rights depends on their location. Instream rights located 
either at the head of a stream or at the bottom of a stream would have no affect. 
A t the head of the stream there are no traditional users above the right to demand 
the transfer of other consumptive rights, while at the bottom of a stream there are 
no traditional users to initiate transfers. At points between the two extremes the 
affect of instream rights will be site specific. The exact effect on the 
transferability of other rights will in part depend on the number of rights located 
21 For a rigorous prescription of this argument see Burness H. Stuart and Quirk James P. 
Water Law Water Transfer~~.I1d Econom; c Effi ciency: The Colorado River Journal of Law 
and Economics 23:111-134 P.119-1Zl. Clearly, based on our previous analysis. Burness 
and Quirt have assumed transaction costs are zero. 
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above and below the instream right. It will also depend on the relative demand for 
consumptive rights by potential users above and below the instream right, and how 
this varies in response to changing economic conditions.22 The exact effect of 
instream rights on the total economic value of a water resource is unclear. Where 
instream rights are purchased,it can be argued the aggregate value of the resource 
has increased. After all, the rights were purchased from willing sellers by willing 
buyers who valued the resource more highly than the seller. However, the argument 
does not consider the effect the purchase will have on the transferability of existing 
consumptive rights. As with the affect of instream rights on transferability, the 
affect on aggregate economic value will be site specific.23 
2.8 SUMMARY 
The way in which property rights to water are structured has important implications 
for the avoidance of externalities and the efficiency of a water allocation system. 
The problem of flow variability can be overcome either by the doctrine of equal 
sharing or prior appropriation. Prior appropriation is superior to equal sharing as it 
encourages the full use of the resource and has lower transaction costs. 
22 For a more complete discussion on the problems generated by the introduction of 
instream rights see Livingston M L and Miller T A A Framework for Analysing the Impact 
of Western Instream Water Rights on Choice Domains: Transferability. Externalities. 
and Consumpti ve Use. Land Economi cs 62( 3): 269-77 and Anderson T L and Johnson R N 
The Problem of Instream Flows Economic Inquiry 24: 535-554. 
23 Ibid, p.27S 
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Wh ere righ ts are defined on the basis of diversion alone, it is likely transfers will 
violate third party rights. Specifying rights on the basis of consumptive use will not 
avoid all externalities as, where transfers create binding constraints, the ability of 
third parties to transfer rights will be impaired. The introduction of instream rights 
is also likely to reduce the transferability of consumptive rights. Where the transfer 
of rights has been impaired, the traditional micro-€conomic efficiency condition that 
the marginal product of resource use is equal across all users is unlikely to be 
approached. Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, where the transferability of 
consumptive rights has been impaired, unequal risk sharing among water right 
holders creates additional inefficiencies in comparison to the allocation of water 
under the doctrine of equal sharing. Because of the potential externalities created 
by water right transfers, the free transferability of rights may need to be restrained. 
The theoretical framework developed above is a useful tool for desigining policy 
initiatives aimed at introducing transferable water rights in New Zealand. For 
example, we know that~ even where rights are delimited on the basis of consumptive 
use, transfers can still produce externalities. This could suggest that the liabilities of 
parties involved in a transfer have to be more clearly stipulated, or perhaps 
institutional arrangements are required to ensure transfers which would produce 
third party impairment can be stopped. However, how do we know which alternative 
is likely to be most cost effective? Is third party impainnent likely to be a problem 
in practice? A way of beginning to answer these questions is to examine the actual 
operation of a water market. The next section presents an empirical analysis of the 
mining privilege system of allocating water. 
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3.0 THE MINJNG PRIVILEGE SYSTEM OF WATER ALLOCATION: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
3 .1 Introduction 
The first step in analysing the mining privilege system of water allocation is to 
acquire an understanding of the property right arrangements which existed and how 
these evolved. Property rights consist of a set of rules which mediate the 
relationships among economic actors and between the actors and their environment. 
Thus property right arrangements present economic agents with a structure of 
constraints, opportunities and incentives with which to guide resource use 
decisions. 24 Understanding how the property rights to water were defined not only 
provides us with a description of the water allocation system but also an 
appreciation of how it was likely to have operated. 
As the economic analysis in the previous section has demonstrated, we can expect 
different outcomes from different property right arrangements. This is because the 
transaction costs of the different property right arrangements differ.25 By 
combining the economic analysis with the description of the mining privilege system 
of property rights, we will,in effect,be forming a series of hypotheses. That is, given 
particular property right arrangements,we can predict certain outcomes. 
24 Hide P Rodney Property Rights and Natural Resource Policy 1987. Published by the 
Centre for Resource Management. 
25 An objective of resource allocation ;s to approximate, as cheaply as possible, the 
result a market would bring about if transactions costs were zero. See Ga1abresi G 
Transaction Costs Resource Allocation and Liability Rules - A Comment Journal of Law 
and Economics 11:67-73. 
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However, all predictions are fallible. 26 One of objectives of this study is to check 
these predictions against empirical experience. The analysis proceeds with a brief 
summary of the property rights structure to water under the mining privilege 
system. By combining the property rights structure with an economic analysis a 
series of predictions concerning transferability, externalities, transactions costs, 
efficiency and equity are made. A summary of the evidence supporting or refuting 
these hypotheses is then examined. Throughout the text the footnotes are designed 
to refer the reader to areas in the appendix where the issues presented are examined 
in greater detail. The analysis concentrates on the period between 1865 and 1926 as 
this was the period for which data was available. It is also by far the most 
interesting period. Water was transferred from miners to farmers, creating the 
potential for third party impairment via changes in diversion consumption ratios. 
3.2 Mining Privilege System Central Otago: Outline of the Property Rights 
Structure 
Mining privileges wi th respect to land and water use were overseen, in both an 
administrative and judicial capacity, by the Warden's Court. The privileges 
established a framework of rights which determined how water and land could be 
used for mining purposes. The Court was constituted in the early 1860s with the 
26 The predictions are formulated by using the method of rational reconstruction. The 
method is based on the premise that individuals act rationally in response to 
constraints, opportunities and incentive structures they confront. However the method 
of rational reconstruction, as it is used here, is based on a narrow definition of 
rationality. The common dllmina'tor of individual choice domains is assumed to be 
personal gain, and this takes precedence over other motivating factors. Individuals 
will differ as to what motivates them and hence what they consider to be rational. 
This is one of the reasons why predictions made here are fallible. The task of the 
study is to check the predictions. 
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begirming of the gold rush in Central Otago. It heard all litigation concerning 
contracts, torts, and disputes over mining privileges. This included hearing all 
applications for, and objections against., the granting or alteration of mining 
privileges in respect to water. Initially, within its jurisdiction, the Court held 
similar powers to a Magistrates Court, and the Warden was often the District 
Magistrate. However, the Court's powers were extended when,in 1898, the Mining 
Act removed the Supreme Court1 jurisdiction over all matters within the Warden'S 
Court, except where the cause of action affected the title to land. In addition to 
these extra powers, towards the turn of the century, the opportunities of appeal from 
the Warden's Court were gradually restricted. The last Warden's Court, at 
Cromwell, closed in 1971. 27 
Outside the administrative system, the structure of property rights which delimited 
individual choice domains, and hence the opportunity set for water resource use 
decisions, had the following key characteristics: 
water allocation was based on prior appropriation: first in time meant first in 
right in periods of low flow; 
water rights were defined on the basis of the quantity diverted; 
conditions specified in the water right could be changed by the warden. 
However, all proposed changes were open to objections from other water right 
28 holders ; 
27 A more comprehensive discussion of the functions of Warden's Court, and its 
jurisdiction can be found in appendix one, page two. 
28 See Appendix One 1.1 The Warden's Court: Administering Water Allocation 
22 
every water right specified the purpose for which water was used. Subject to 
objections, the purpose could be changed. However, where the right was 
transferred from mining to irrigation half the water was to be made available 
f b · 29 or use y millers ; 
for non-use or not abiding by the conditions specified on a .water licence, the 
licence could be forfeited; 
to avoid forfeiture a water right holder could apply to Warden's Court for 
'protection'. Unless there were 'special circumstances I protection could not 
be granted for periods exceeding 12 months30; 
subject to conditions stipulated by the Warden and the compensation of land 
owners, statutory rights of easement for water races were granted; 
the mining acts made provision for instream flows; 
a water right could be sold in part or in whole and a right holder was entitled 
to sell or lease water. 31 
The water resource was initially at the sole disposal of the mining industry. In the 
last two decades before the tum of the century., large leasehold properties were 
subdivided. This put increasing demand on the water resource from pastoralists 
wanting to use the water for irrigation. Legislative amendments allowed the water 
to be used for irrigation purposes and,as the mining industry went through a series of 
29 See Appendix One 1.2 Specification and Variation of Rights 
30 For provisions pertaining to protection and forfeiture see Appendix One 1.4 
31 Ibid 1.3 
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contractions and expansions, water was transferred into agricultural use. The state, 
in the first two decades of this century, in an attempt to gain control of water 
allocation for the development of community irrigation schemes, bought key water 
rights and made legislative changes which constrained the transfer of water separate 
32 from land. 
3.3 Mining Privilege System: The Expected Outcomes 
Contemporary theory of transferable water rights suggests that the' mining privilege 
system of water allocation would present major obstacles to the transfer of water 
separate to land. Rights were specified on the basis of diversion; there was no 
provision for the Warden to evaluate historical consumption. Thus,transfers of water 
via changes in the point of intake would be likely to cause third party impainnent 
and would be keenly contested. Changes in purpose from mining to irrigation would 
also have altered the consumption-diversion ratio along streams. The ad hoc 
provision, protecting miners interests, to release half of the water for use by other 
miners when rights were transferred from mining to irrigation, would have helped 
avoid some third party impairment from changes in purpose. However, it is unlikely 
all mining operations had return flow coefficients of 0.5 and thus a change in purpose 
would be likely to cause third party impairment. More generally the transfer of 
water separate from land would have possibly been obstructed by the creation of 
binding flow constraints, these being produced by instream rights33 and the drought 
conditions typical in Central Otago. 
32 Ibid. 1.0, and 1.6. 
33 In the fi rst decade of thi s century, under considerable pressure from farmers, the 
Warden's Court revoked instream rights. This suggests instream rights had a 
significant influence on the water resource allocation. Because of the lack of data 
on instream rights it ha~ been possible to analyse their impact on transferability. 
1', 
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Potentially the most important obstacle to market transfers were the provisions for 
forfeiture. Any right holder could file a suit for forfeiture of another right. With a 
successful forfeiture, a water right was effectively cancelled. TIlis meant inferior 
rights moved up a step in the priority ranking and gained access to additional water 
in times of low flow. The opportlmity for forfeiture presented itself where 
appropriators disregarded conditions attached to their rights or an appropriator, 
usually a mining operation nearing the end of its life expectancy, neglected to use its 
right for a period exceeding one month. The possibility of forfeiture presented the 
individual with an alternative to market transfer to gain access to ,additional water. 
All an appropriator had to do was wait for the opportunity. However, while waiting, 
it was possible another individual or company would actually purchase the right. 
The probability that an individual would choose forfeiture rather than a market 
transfer would depend on how often the opportunity for forfeiture presented itself, 
competition from other buyers, the likelihood of objections to the changes in points 
of intake required for market purchases, the chance that a forfeiture would be 
successful and the distributions of costs and benefits of the alternative means of 
transfer. With forfeiture, individuals could share in the costs and benefits of 
transferring water, whereas, with market exchanges, costs and benefits would be 
concentrated with the individuals concerned. Provided that the number of right 
holders along a watercourse was not so great as to present large transaction costs to 
organisation and to substantially reduce any share of forfeited water, forfeiture 
would be an attractive means of resource transfer. This would be reinforced by the 
obstacles to market transfers already discussed. 
However, water right holders could not guarantee that they would share equally in 
the proceeds of forfeiture. Their share would depend on the water deficit in times 
of low flow experienced by those rights ranked between them and the forfeited 
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right. Where such deficits were large,lower priority rights might only obtain a small 
fraction of the forfeited water. It is also possible that a forfeiture could result in 
some lower priority rights obtaining less water than they did prior to the forfeiture. 
This would be the case where the first few righ ts ranked immediately inferior to the 
forfeited right had considerably lower return flow coefficients than the forfeited 
right, and they had sizeable water deficits in times of low flow. Thus suits for 
forfeiture could generate litigation involving more than two parties. 
The potential for forfeiture to generate complex and protracteg litigation would 
mean such transfers entailed large transaction costs. However, it is likely the 
alternative means of transfer, market exchange, also faced large transaction costs. 
The potential for third party impairment from changes in diversion-consumption 
ratios would also involve considerable litigation. The advantage forfeiture would 
have over market transfer is that the price of the water would be zero. However, 
regardless of the means of transfer, the likelihood of litigation would ensure that 
transfers of water separate to land would entail large transaction costs. 
Because of the obstacles to market transfers and the provision for forfeiture, it is 
unlikely water would have been used in an efficient manner.34 The prospect of 
forfeiture would ensure water right holders used their full allocation of water. It 
would provide a disincentive to conserve water. It would also provide a disincentive 
to lease water as this could provide grounds for forfeiture. Because of the 
restrictions on transfers between appropriator's, risk would be shared unequally 
among right holders. As Burness and Quirk argue, this implies additional 
inefficiencies in comparison to allocating the water via the doctrine of equal sharing. 
34 The term of efficiency requires an objective function. At this stage in the analysis 
it is being used as a general concept. 
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Combining the property rights structure under the mining privilege system with 
contemporary economic theory of water transfers generates a series of expected 
outcomes. Both forfeiture and market exchange had a blend of factors for and 
against them as preferred methods of transferring water separate from land. 
Without intensive empi.rical investigation it is impossible to say a priori which would 
be more common. However, we could expect water transfers to cause third party 
impairment. Externalities could occur either where water was transferred via 
forfeiture or market exchange. Both could potentially change diversion-consumption 
ratios injuring third parties. The litigation produced by either form of transfer 
would generate large transaction costs. Because forfeiture provides a disincentive 
to conserve water and market transfers were constrained it is unlikely water was 
used in an efficient manner. Nor would the system be equitable. While the fear of 
forfeiture would ensure water was used wastefully, constraints on transferability 
would deny individuals access to water. In the proceeding analysis evidence will be 
examined which either refutes or supports the above predictions. 
3.4 Pattern of Water Transfer 
One of the most notable features about water allocation in Central Otago is that all 
the available water was allocated within just over a ten year period, between 1860 
and 1871. The water came from tributaries flowing into the Clutha River and its 
main tributary the Kawerau River. These rivers were inaccessible as a source of 
water. The rapid exploitation of all the available water is consistent with the 
simplicity of the allocative mechanism used prior appropriation. This allowed 
miners to fully use all the available water, all year round. This was particularly 
evident when the Otago Catchment Board audited mining privilege water rights 
between 1969 and 1971. They found 728 water race licences current. In many 
instances the board found farmers held rights to excessive volumes of water, only 
available in winter or at peak spring flows. As two or more farmers were often 
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located along a race the 728 water race licences could have generated over 2000 
applications for water rights. 35 
It has been and still is common to transfer water rights in association with the sale 
of a block of land or sell water, itself, from races. Many of the water rights, before 
the turn of the century, were issued to 'waterrace' or 'watercourse' companies 
which sold the water to miners for sluicing purposes. As mining activity declined a 
few of these companies sold water to farmers for irrigation. The most well known of 
these was the Cromwell Development Company which operated until 1935. By then 
the largest player in the water market was the State which had constructed several 
community irrigation schemes and sold water, at subsidised prices, to farmers; the 
schemes are still operating today. The most common way in which water rights are 
transferred among farmers today is with the subdivision of, or sale of, a block of 
land.36 
As argued above, forfeiture was an alternative means to market exchange for 
transferring water separate from land. However, it was not possible to say which 
would be preferred. Preliminary data from the Blacks WardenS Court, one of six key 
Warden t s Courts in Central Otago, suggests forfeiture was slightly more common 
than market transfer. The Warden recorded only applications to divert water to new 
locations via changes in the point of intake. It was not possible to say how many of 
these reflected market exchanges without further extensive research. However, 
35 There are also 139 mlnlng privilege licences in respect to water held by the Dunedin 
City Council. See Gillies A J. Notes on Mining Privileges Otago Catchment Board 
lliQ.r.i W78/78. Private water rights in Central Otago were valued at roughly $80 
million in 1967 per com L W Hinchey former farm valuer in Central Otago. 
36 See Appendix Two 1.1 Appendix 4 contains a copy of a mining privilege licence in 
respect to water. The document contains numerous transfers of water in association 
with blocks of land. 
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most of the alterations occurred in periods where mining companies were 
amalgamated and water was transferred from mining to irrigation, thus many of the 
alterations will reflect market exchanges.3 7 
It is clear both alterations in the point of intake and forfeitures responded to the 
degree of water scarcity. In periods where economic activity made increased 
demands on the water resource, alterations in the point of intake and forfeitures 
both reached peak levels. They also responded to statutory provisions extending the 
grounds for protection and a fine in lieu of forfeiture. When th.ese provisions were 
introduced, in the decade before the turn of the century, the number of forfeitures 
rapidly declined while the number of alterations in the point of intake rose 
dramatically. 3 8 
3.5 Externalities: TIrird Party Impairment 
The Warden's court case history examined provides substantial evidence that changes 
in purpose, forfeitures and alterations in the point of intakes caused third party 
impairment through changes in consumption diversion ratios.39 Data from the 
Blacks Warden' s Court, indicates third party impairment presented major obstacles 
to the transfer of water separate from land.40 On average, over a fifty year period, 
70 percent of the attempts to transfer water via shifts in the point of intake were 
objected to. Probably the most striking evidence that the variation of rights caused 
third party impairment through changes in consumption-diversion ratios, comes from 
37 Ibi d 1. Z 
38 Ibid 
39 See Appendix 2 1.3.1 to 1.3.4. 
40 Ibi d 1. Z 
41 A copy of the petition, and minutes of mines committees which examined the petitioners 
can be found in appendix three, also see appendix Z, 2.3.5. 
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a petition to parliament in 1919. 41 A group of 21 farmers complained about the 
affect changes in purpose had on existing irrigation rights. They requested that all 
rights changed from mining to irrigation should lose their priority relative to other 
irrigation rights. The farmers request was turned down. It would have been contrary 
to the State I s interest. At the time the State was purchasing water rights from 
mining companies to use in community irrigation schemes.42 
One of the most interesting points to emerge from the analysis of case history is 
that, where transferable rights are defined on the basis of diversion, individuals have 
an incentive to violate others rights. 43 By shifting the point of intake downstream, 
an appropriator may gain access to a larger volume of water than that consumed at 
the previous location. This is because tributaries between the old and new location 
will supply additional water in times of low flow. Thus, where a market exchange 
alters the point of intake, and more water will be obtained at the new point of 
intake, it is in the interest of both parties to define the transfer solely on the basis 
of the quantity diverted. Along a fully appropriated stream this will be likely to 
cause third party impairment. 
Another interesting point to come out of the analysis of third party impairment is 
that the likelihood that changes in purpose would be objected to depended on the 
volume of water involved. Virtually all changes in purposes which involved large 
rights were objected to, whereas those involving small rights were not. 44 An 
explanation for this disparity is that,where alterations involved large quantities of 
water, effects on other appropriations rights are highly visible, however, with small 
quantities of water, third party impairment may be imperceptible. 
42 See Appendix 1, 1.6. 
43 Appendix 2, 2.3.1 
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In a case cited in appendix two, the State objected to ten applications to change 
pU!1>ose, simultaneously placed. all involving small quantities of water in the same 
catchment, only to find the appropriators involved had used the water illegally for 
many years for irrigation pU!1>oses. In aggregate, the variation of the ten rights was 
viewed as having a substantial affec t on the State's water right. However, the 
impact had already occurred unperceived, as the ten rights had gradually, over a 
period of time, been illegally used for irrigation purposes. 45 The problem is one of 
gradual and imperceptible short-term changes cuhninating in concentrated long-term 
impacts. 
3.6 Transaction Costs 
It is clear from court data and case history the mining privilege system of water 
allocation produced large transaction costs. The majority of attempts to transfer 
water separate from land, or alter the purpose of use,met with objections from third 
parties. In one case, in order to secure the purchase of a right, parliament was 
successfully petitioned to alter the grounds for forfeiture. In another case, in order 
to secure a change of pU!1>ose, a miner deliberately applied for protection. The 
grounds on which the miner applied meant that if the judge granted protection a 
change of pU!1>0se would have been sanctioned. The application involved the miner 
in extensive litigation. In another case, to avoid forfeiture in order to sell water 
rights to a willing buyer, an appropriator employed a 'caretaker' to make it appear 
the rights were still in use. Water was so valuable in Central Otago, individuals were 
willing to incur large transaction costs to avoid losing rights or to acquire rights.46 
44 Appendix 2, 2.2 
45 Ibid 2.3.4 
46 Ibid 2.3.1 - 2.3.5 
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The additional powers granted to the Warden I s Court, except where the cause of 
action affected the title of land, indicates litigation over water rights did indeed 
produce large transac tion costs. The powers were granted to the court in 1898.47 
This was at the end of a decade which saw record numbers of forfeitures and 
disputes over the alteration in points of intake. 48 The 1898 Mining Act states that 
the additional powers were granted; 
"For the purpose of enabling the Court the more effectually to 
exercise the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon it by the 
act, and to enforce obedience to its orders and to punish 
disobedience thereof, it is hereby declared that, in so far as !lQ 
sufficient provision in that behalf is elsewhere contained in this 
Act, the Court and the Warden thereof shall be deemed to have 
and may exercise all the powers of the Supreme Court or a 
Judge thereof...49 (emphasis added) 
3.7 Efficiency 
It was argued in the first section of the report, that as transaction costs grow 
equilibrium conditions move further away from a efficient outcome. That is, the 
larger are transaction costs, the less likely it is that resources will move to those who 
place the highest value on them. Different property right structures produce 
different transaction costs. Under the mining privilege system of water allocation, 
in order to avoid forfeiture, appropriators were encouraged to use water without 
47 See Appendi x One 1.1 
48 See Appendix Two 
49 Mining Act 1898 S 274 
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regard to waste. If appropriators did not use their water rights or any portion of 
their right, the unused water could be forfeited. In a case cited in appendix two a 
miner kept his dredge operating purely to protect the transferability of his water 
rights. 50 The property rights structure under the mining privilege system created 
large transaction costs and provided appropriators with a disincentive to conserve 
water. 
It was argued in the first section, that where the transferability of rights is 
restricted, prior appropriation will lead to additional inefficiencies in comparison to 
equal sharing. This is because risk would be shared unequally among appropriators. 
By the end of the first two decades of this century"l the state had placed considerable 
restrictions on the transferability of water rights separate to land. 51 The last major 
transfer of water rights separate to land took place with mortgage sales in the 
1930s.52 Given the restrictions placed on transferability we would expect risk to be 
unequally shared among appropriators and inefficiencies to result. 
There is evidence to suggest that today risk is indeed shared unequally among 
appropriators. Generally, only appropriators who hold high priority rights, or are on 
community irrigation schemes, their operation dependent on high priority rights, can 
risk investing in efficient irrigation methods. This is because the priority ranking of 
senior appropriators guarantees them a reliable supply of water, whereas junior 
rights may have only an intermittent water supply. In addition, the senior 
appropriators often only allocate a portion of their water to more efficient 
50 See Appendix 2, 2.3.3 
51 See Appendi x 1, 1.3 
52 Per com Brian Mooney (Otago Catchment Board Officer, who oversees the operation of 
mining privileges and has audited all existing rights. 
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irrigation techniques. This is because of the diseconomies of scale involved in using 
these techniques. Thus, an opportuni ty exists to increase aggregate farm revenue by 
sharing water out among appropriators. 53 
3.8 Equity 
Under the mining privilege system, once streams were fully appropriated, means of 
access to the resource was limited as the potential for thirdf~i~pairment created 
obstacles to transfer. At the same time, the threat of forfeiture meant on occasions 
that appropriators wasted water to ensure others could not lay claim to it. Thus, 
those who may have valued the resource more highly than existing users were denied 
access to the water. Today, along fully appropriated streams, individuals still have 
very limited access to water resources. They can either acquire water by purchasing 
land with an associated water right or wait until a right is cancelled. A way to 
provide a means of access to water resources for those who value the resource more 
highly than existing users, is to introduce a market. 
It can be argued, where the means of access to a resource requires people to 
participate in a market, their ability to secure the resource will be dependent on 
their income, and thus people on low incomes will be denied access to the resource. 
However, what people can afford may bear no relation to what the resource is worth 
to them in terms of future income. Agricultural use of water has a rapidly 
decreasing marginal product. This is why under prior appropriation where 
transferability is restricted, water could be shared out to increase aggregate 
revenue. The marginal value of water is worth more to junior right holders who have 
little water in times of low flow than it is to senior appropriators who have an 
53 See Appendix 2, 2.4 
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abundant supply of water. TIle expected income stream from the resource is higher 
for junior appropriators than for senior appropriators. Thus, junior rights holders 
would be willing to pay more for the resource than senior right holders as they place 
a higher value on the resource. Provided prospective abstractors could gain access 
to finance, water resources would be transferred. Individuals who formally lacked a 
means of access to water would become better off in absolute terms. In aggregate., 
the value of the resource has been increased as it has been transferred to people who 
place the highest value on it. As the water has moved to those who value it most 
highly, the resource distribution is now more equitable. 
3.9 Surrunary 
Combining the economic theory of transferable water rights with the property right 
structure under the mining privilege system, we were able to make several 
predictions about how the system was likely to have operated. The central 
prediction made was that the variation of rights under .the mining privilege system 
would be likely to cause third party impairment. Indeed, major externalities were 
created by forfeitures, changes in the point of intake and changes in purpose; all of 
which have the potential to alter diversion-consumption ratios along streams. 
Without a more intensive empirical analysis, it is impossible to say what was the 
exact extent of the third party impairment. However, in that individuals were 
willing to petition parliament, it is likely third party impairment produced by the 
variation of rights was quite significant. 
Apart from the confinnation of theoretical predictions, the analysis also made two 
other important findings. First., where transfers are based solely on the quantity 
diverted, individuals have an incentive to cause third party impairment. The second 
is that, where the variation of rights causes small impairments of other rights, this 
may not easily be perceived. However, in the long term, in aggregate, small 
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changes might be very significant. In the next section we will look closely at what 
these findings, and the confirmation of third party impainnent,imply for a system of 
transferable water rights in New Zealand. Of particular interest is, do the findings 
present a case for government involvement in a system of transferable rights? 
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4.0 A MARKET FOR WATER IN NEW ZEALAND 
4.1 Introduction 
This section draws on what has been learnt from the empirical analysis of the mining 
privilege system, and the review of theoretical considerations in the first section, to 
visualise how a market for water could be organised in New Zealand. The discussion 
begins by suggesting a method by which unappropriated water could be allocated 
among competing users and a means for transferring rights which would help avoid 
third party impairment. How public goods such as recreational values and public 
bads such as pollution could be accommodated alongside a market is then examined. 
Finally the report looks at whether it is necessary to legislate against the potential 
development of water monopolies. The suggestions are not intended to be final 
answers; all have a number of pro's and con I s. The central question the discussion 
attempts to address is what is the most appropriate property right structure for a 
water market in New Zealand? An underlying question the discussion addresses is 
what, if any, rationale is there for central government involvement in the 
management of water resources within the context of a market setting? 
4.2 The Initial Allocation Process 
Water Boards produce draft River Management plans, setting out management 
objectives and allocating water among competing users. The plans are often but not 
always open to public submission from interested groups. The revised plans then 
await approval from the Board members who are publicly elected. The plans set 
minimum stream flows designed to cater for wilderness and recreational interests, 
acceptable levels of pollutant discharges and the volume of water to be allocated to 
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consumptive uses. Since not all rivers face intense competition from different user 
groups, minimum flows have not been set on all New Zealand rivers. We will assume, 
for the purpose of the forgoing discussion, that Water Boards have been asked to set 
minimum stream flows and acceptable levels of water quality on all significant 
watercourses. 54 The remaining water is then available to abstractive consumptive 
users. 
Assuming Boards have set bench mark levels for different users groups, how is the 
water to be allocated among users within each group? From the perspective of the 
Crown,55 if rights are to become transferable, giving existing rights to users is. in 
effect, to give away the discounted value of the resource to private interests. This 
raises an equity issue, is it fair to give Crown resources away to private interests? 
However, private water users will argue that in purchasing assets which have 
associated water rights, they have already paid for the capitalised value of the 
resource. Given the precedent set by the Crown in handing over fishing resources 
and the argumen ts which will be advanced by existing water users, it is likely the 
Crown would proceed to give the water to existing users. For the moment we 
consider how rights could be allocated to abstractive consumptive users for 
example, rights for irrigation or domestic consumptive use. How rights to discharge 
pollutants and instream rights could be managed and allocated is discussed after the 
market transfer process has been examined. 
54. For example, setting minimum stream flows and water quality standards for rivers ;n 
National parks would be meaningless. The remaining water is then available to abstractive 
consumptive users. 
55 It;s important to note the 1967 Water Soil and Conservation Act does not vest 
ownership of water resources in the Crown. Rather it vests specific rights to use water in 
the Crown. See Section 21(1). It is possible ownership may rest with the Maori people of 
New Zealand. See Russ, M J. 1986 Water Charges in New Zealand A report for the NZCA. 
Wa i kato Va 11 ey Authority, Ham; lton. The use of the word "Crown" in thi s text can be taken 
to mean a partnership between Maori and non-Maori in New Zealand. 
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4.3 On-going Allocation 
As noted in the first section of this report, Water Boards have attempted to share 
hardships created by water deficits equally among users. This has led to complicated 
interdependencies between water right holders. Different groups of rights are 
suspended at different flow rates and, within groups, appropriators share water in 
times of low flow. As argued in the first section, systems which attempt to equally 
share water will lead to increased specification, monitoring and other enforcement 
costs in comparison to a system of prior appropriation. The increased specification 
costs are reflected by complex management and water right allocation plans. Since 
plans often rely on users sharing or stopping appropriation at different flow rates, 
boards have created for themselves a substantial monitoring role. It appears, at 
least in the case of one board, the additional costs of attempting to share hardships 
equally has been implicitly recognised. A management plan allocating water on the 
basis of prior appropriation has been drafted. 56 
If prior appropriation is generally adopted as an on-going method of allocating 
water, the role of Catchment Boards in specification, monitoring and enforcement of 
water rights could be minimised. Where streams are not yet fully appropriated, 
prospective abstractors could bid on a "first in first served" basis for water 
56. The management plan referred to is for the Kakanui River Catchment in Otago. The Plan 
suggests the unrestricted allocation of rights up to level of demand which can be met with 
an "acceptable degree of reliability". Secondary rights will then be issued on a "first on 
last off" basis. see Draft Kakanui River Catchment Plan. Otago Catchment Board and 
Regional Water Board August 1987. 
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rights. 57 Once issued, monitoring and enforcement would be up to the water right 
holders within each catchment. Enforcement would no longer involve monitoring 
flow rates and ensuring all users reduced diversion by specied quantities, in periods 
of scarcity. Rather it would simply entail" ensuring the last on are first off" in 
times of low flow. In fact right holders could develop whatever monitoring system 
they desired. Legislative provision could be made to allow right holders, within a 
catchment, to elect their own system of monitoring and enforcement. Since water 
righ t holders would pay the cost of enforcement, we would expect them to select the 
most cost-effective method. 
Where prior appropriation is adopted as an allocative mechanism, the case for the 
transferability of rights is made stronger. As demonstrated in the previous two 
sections, where transferability is restricted, prior appropriation leads to both an 
inefficient and inequitable outcome. However, transfers can cause third party 
impairment through changes in consumption-diversion ratios. We will now look at 
how a transfer process can be arranged to avoid these and other externalities. 
4.4 Transfer Arrangements 
Where a river is not yet fully appropriated, individuals who want to purchase a water 
right have a choice: they can either buy a right to a portion of unappropriated water 
or purchase a right off an existing appropriator. Which alternative is chosen will 
depend upon the value of the unappropriated water in comparison to the water 
57. Water Boards could invite bids for "unappropriated" water on behalf of crown. The 
boards could receive a handling fee. Where bids were simultenously placed, the tender 
offering the highest per unit price would receive the senior rights. 
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already appropriated. It will also depend on the transaction costs of the 
alternatives. The Crown selling unappropriated water and individuals selling 
appropriated water would both have an incentive to minimise transaction costs. 
As demonstrated in the analysis of the mining privilege system along fully 
appropriated streams, water transfers or changes in purpose of water use are likely 
to cause third party impairment through changing consumption-diversion ratios. A 
way of avoiding this kind of third party impairment is to delimit rights on the basis 
of consumptive use wherever appropriators want to transfer rights or change the 
purpose of use. However, it may be argued that, along watercourses which are not 
yet fully appropriated, transfers are unlikely to produce externalities. Thus, defining 
transfers on the basis of consumptive use may appear, in many cases, to be an 
unnecessary transaction cost. 
Defining consumptive use may not always be easy. Where water is to be exported, 
the new point of use being in another catchment, defining consumption is straight 
forward: export means the return flow is zero. Similarly many industrial processes 
will use and return easily-specified amounts of water. However, where water is used 
for irrigation and a transfer is within a catchment, estimating return flows may 
prove difficult. This would be particularly so where geological structures and soil 
types differed within the watershed. In New Mexico, where water rights are 
transferable, the state engineer assesses agricultural consumptive use by evaluating 
the area actually irrigated. This will be a straightforward task where land forms are 
homogenous; however, where terrain is not regular, the calculation of consumptive 
use may prove more difficult. However, it should be noted that even where rights 
are defined solely on the basis of diversion, administrative costs would not be zero. 
Also, where water has a high scarcity value and thus access to water necessitates a 
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transfer rather than the purchase of unappropriated water, the transaction cost in 
, th' t b . 'f' t 58 comparIson to e prIce may no e slgm lcan . 
The argument that defining transfers of water on the basis of consumptive use 
imposes unecessary transaction costs, where streams are not yet fully appropriated, 
has a major flaw. The argument is based on the assumption that along streams as 
yet not "fully appropriated" externalities are not likely to occur. The watercourse is, 
in effect. fully appropriated; the "unappropriated" portion is owned by the Crown. A 
transfer or change of purpose of use which increases the consumption-diversion ratio 
along a stream does so by imposing a negative externality on Crown rights. 
As mentioned above, individuals have a choice: they can either purchase water from 
another appropriator or they can purchase it from the Crown. Where water rights 
are bought from the Crown, only the consumptive-use coefficient of the buyer needs 
to be defined. Consumptive use of an instream flow is zero. At first glance, the 
Crown appears to have an advantage in the market as it need not go to the trouble of 
defining its consumptive-use coefficient; that is, the Crown faces lower transaction 
costs than other sellers and hence could earn an above normal profit. However, as 
noted, the additional cost of defining consumptive use is not necessarily significant. 
In many cases,it may only involve calculating the area which will be irrigated. Also, 
selling water will not be a costless process for the Crown. It has to ensure the 
appropriate volumes of water are available at points where individuals wish 
58 In New Mexico the cost of protecting rights on the basis of consumptive use amounts to 
about $1.30 pe r acre foot pe r annum. Thi s compares favourably with the market pri ce of 
water which typically approachs $2,000 per acre foot per annum. See Gisser, Hand 
Johnson, RM "Institutional Restrictions on the Transfer of Water Rights and the Survival of 
An Agency" in Anderson, T Led. 1983. Water Rights Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy. 
and the Environment Ballinger Publishing P,147. 
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to make a purchase. Thus, it is unlikely the Crown would face lower transactions 
costs which would give it a monopoly advantage in a water market. 
Delimiting transfers on the basis of consumptive use has several advantages. It 
captures externalities which might otherwise not be caught in a notification and 
objection process similar to that used by the Warden's Court. In Central Otago 
individuals rarely objected to changes of purpose which involved small quantities of 
water. Changes in purpose involving small quantities of water were not perceived to 
generate substantial third party impairment. However, as was illustrated, many 
small changes in aggregate, can have a substantial effect on other rights. Defining 
transfers on the basis of consumption avoids this kind of impairment. The analysis of 
the Otago experience demonstrated that, under prior appropriation, where rights are 
defined solely on the basis of diversion, individuals had an incentive to transfer 
rights to diversion points where they could obtain additional water. The increase in 
consumption obtained was at the expense of third parties. Defining transfers on the 
basis of consumptive use makes this kind of impairment easier to detect. 
One of the major advantages in defining all transfers on the basis of consumptive use 
is that it provides a consistent framework for market participants - the rules of the 
game are clear and uniform. An alternative would be the requirement that transfers 
be defined on the basis of consumptive use only where it was "deemed necessary", 
for example along streams where transfers were "unlikely to cause third party 
impairment,,59 However, how would we recognise when it was necessary to define a 
transfer on the basis of consumptive use? Could we leave this judgement to 
technical experts overseeing transfers or simply wait for externalities to start 
occurring? Such an ad hoc arrangement of property rights would itself produce 
59 This of course assumes negative externalities imposed on crown rights do not count as 
third party impairment. 
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unnecessary transaction costs and create uncertainty for market participants. 
However, defining rights on the basis of consumption does not avoid all 
externalities. Consumption-diversion ratios are not always easy to calculate:there is 
room for error. Transfers may damage other rights by reducing their 
transferability. Changing the point of intake may leave a third party's diversion 
point above the water level at which abstraction is possible. One way of capturing 
these externalities is to have a notification and objection process similar to that 
used by the Warden's Court. 
However, an unrestrained objection process would merely increase rather than 
decrease transaction costs. Where objections were groundless, unnecessary costs 
would be imposed on individuals wishing to transfer rights. To minimise transaction 
costs, an objection process should be structured in a way which discourages 
groundless objections. The mining privilege system provided this incentive structure 
by placing an onus on individuals to arrive at a settlement before objecting, and a 
provision existed which allowed Wardens to award costs against individuals who made 
"frivilous" objections. The reason the objection process reduced the transferability 
of rights was that variations in rights were not assessed on the basis of consumptive 
use and thus transfers were likely to cause third party impairments. Where 
consumptive use is used as a measure of transferability, an objection process need 
not constrain transfers. 
If we accept the need for an objection process, the immediate question that arises is 
what would be the institutional framework of such a process? We can image that 
liabili ties, based on a no damage principle, could be assigned to parties involved in an 
exchange. Where a transfer could potentially damage third party rights, parties in a 
dispute could resort to a Court of law for the settlement of claims. Alternatively, 
the existing administrative procedures of water boards and the 
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appellant channel to the Planning Tribunal and Law Courts could be used to resolve 
disputes. Overseas experience suggests administrative procedures have produced 
lower transaction costs than judicial methods.60 
A possible reason for the lower cost of administrative procedures is that the 
agencies involved are more familiar with water resource issues than judicial bodies. 
In particular, agencies involved with administering and monitoring water resources 
are more familiar with the technical issues involved. They also have a broad 
understanding of how catchment dynamics can be affected by transfers. The courts 
on the other hand treat all disputes on a case by case basis without necessarily 
having regard to broader issues, such as catchment dynamics. Hearings before water 
boards would act as information brokerage points. Public information about the 
dynamics of catchments would be increased, and individuals wanting to sell or buy 
rights would have a better idea of the opportunities which existed. 
The involvement of water boards in resolving disputes could be objected to on the 
grounds that boards will obstruct transfers. That boards have a history of resource 
planning and allocation and thus would be unlikely to be happy to leave allocation 
decisions to the market. However, the only principle on which a board could reject a 
transfer is that the transfer would damage a third party. If boards did obstruct 
transfers, parties involved in an exchange could appeal to the Planning Tribunal and 
then a Court of Law. Further, it should be remembered that Water Boards are 
elected bodies. Where boards unnecessarily obstruct transfers they could be voted 
out of office. 
60 Gisser, M and Johnson R M. Supra Note 5. P.146 
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4.5 m.'5tream Rights: National Verse Regional Allocation 
It was assumed earlier that Water Boards in an initial allocation plan have set 
minimum stream flows for wildlife and recreational activities. However, the 
question should be raised, why should individuals or groups not purchase these rights 
themselves? The answer is they can; however, instream rights suffer from the free 
rider problem. It would be too costly for private parties to contract to exclude 
non-payers from enjoying the resource. 61 This suggests instream rights will be 
undersupplied by the market. Hence the assumption that instream rights could be 
initially set by the Water Boards, as is currently the practice. 
The volume of instream rights has to be responsive to changing values within 
society. Instream rights have a national interest component. People located all over 
New Zealand and in other parts of the world place value on the mere existence of 
living organisms in our streams and rivers, even if they never see them. A way of 
taking the national interest component into account is to vest instream rights in the 
Department of Conservation. The department could then be responsible for 
supplementing instream rights by purchasing unappropriated water or existing 
consumptive rights. The volume of instream rights could then be responsive, through 
political processes, to changing social values. 
61 Far from estimates made by farmers and catchment board staff. it appears the price of 
high priority right in Central Otago ranges between $100,000 and $200,000 per head. (1 head 
= 100m3 Ihr). It is hard to imagine environmental groups in New Zealand affording this kind 
of price. 
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There is no guarantee that the Department of Conservation would be able to select 
the volume of instream rights for which society is willing to pay. However, political 
and economic feedback mechanisms could act as a guideline to the Department. If 
an oversupply of instream rights was produced, as water prices reached peak levels, 
consumptive users would put pressure on the Department to sell or lease water. In 
the converse case, an undersupply, environmental groups would put pressure on the 
Department to buy additional rights. The public good aspect of instream rights 
means, to a large extent, we have to rely on political processes to achieve an optimal 
supply. 
The exact supply of instream rights would depend on the relative political powers of 
competing user groups - consumptive users and the general public. Where a user 
group has power which exceeds the value the community places on the resource a 
misallocation of the resource could occur. Since consumptive users face both 
concentrated costs and benefits, we would expect them to be more organised than 
users of instream rights, who face dispersed costs and benefits. The advantage of 
vesting instream rights in the Department of Conservation is its conservation 
advocacy role could help balance the stakes. Since instream rights have both a 
national and regional interest component, it is important that the Department is held 
accountable to both parties for any allocation of instream rights. Institutional 
structures which reflect the actual value people place on instream resources rather 
than their relative political power are needed. The review of accountability 
structures will be a central task of those reviewing the resource use statutes. It is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
If instream righ ts have a regional in terest component, why not leave their allocation 
up to a regional body? Allocation of instream rights on a regional basis faces two 
major problems. A regional body would have to receive funds from central 
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government to ensure it could purchase the national interest component of instream 
resources. Since funds would be channelled from two different sources, both players, 
central government and regional government, have an incentive to persuade the 
other to bear all the costs of purchasing instream rights. For example, a regional 
body could hold off supplementing instream rights in anticipation that central 
government, under pressure from environmental groups, would step in and make the 
necessary purchase. Incentive structures would have to be constructed which would 
prevent such stand off situations occurring and ensure both parties paid their fair 
share. Developing this kind of neutral incentive structure may prove very difficult. 
The second problem arises because of relative size of the portfolio of instream rights 
a region is likely to hold. Where instream rights are held by the Department of 
Conservation their supplementation within a region can be made without additional 
expenditure by reallocating rights within the national portfolio. Rights no longer 
considered to have a high value for instream use can be sold to purchase higher 
valued instream rights. In contrast, where instream resources are allocated on a 
regional basis, flexibility is reduced as the smaller size of regional portfolios will 
present fewer opportunities to reallocate rights. Rather, additional purchases may 
have to be made. Allocating instream rights through a centralised body will produce 
economies of scale which generate flexibility not available to small regional bodies. 
Minimum instream flows are currently supplemented through National or Local 
Conservation Orders. As a method of obtaining instream rights, such orders suffer 
from several drawbacks. First, they pertain to unappropriated water. This places 
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limits on their ability to supplement minimum flows.62 Another drawback is their 
inflexibility. The Conservation Order for the Rakaia River took over 5 years to put 
in place. Revoking an order may prove just as difficult. In a market context, once 
the initial stock of instream rights had been set on the basis of minimum flow rates, 
flexibility would be achieved by the buying, selling or leasing of instream rights. It 
could be argued that a major constraint on this process would be financiaL However, 
a base stock of instream rights would have already been allocated to the Department 
of Conservation. Its job would be reallocating or supplementing rights~ not 
purchasing an initial stock. Also, as the Tribunal and Court hearings over the Rakaia 
case have shown, Conservation Orders are far from costless. In a market context all 
rights acquired through a Conservation Order would still have to be purchased, 
otherwise instream users would have an unfair advantage in the market. 
Conservation Orders are redundant in a market context. 
In the first section of the report it was shown how instream rights may reduce the 
transferability of existing consumptive rights. However, the impact of instrenm 
rights on aggregate economic value is unclear. The reduction in economic value 
from restrictions on transferability of consumptive rights could be offset by the 
additional value of the instream right. Where the proposed purchase of instream 
right was likely to restrict the transferability of existing rights, we would expect 
62 for example, the mlnlng privilege system fully appropriated many streams 1n Central 
Otago to the poi nt where summer fl ows are absent. 51 nce the Otago Catchment Board 1 s unable 
to cancel water rights issued as m1ning privileges. instream flows could only be 
supplemented by the purchase of rights for instream use. 
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Water Boards to turn down such transfers. This would be consistent with a Water 
Board's regional perspective. Water Boards are elected locally and are thus more 
likely to put regional interests ahead of national interests. Indeed, in Colorado 
where state water agencies have been responsible for the appropriation of instream 
rights, the status quo has tended to be preserved. Instream rights have been 
acquired either near headwaters or along unappropriated streams; in these locations 
they do not affect the transferability of existing consumptive rights.63 
A way of ensuring Water Boards do not obstruct the purchase of instream rights is to 
use a restrictive interpretation of the no damage principle. Where the purchase of 
instream rights would place restrictions on potential future transfers of consumptive 
rights, the no damage principle would not be applied. However, where an instream 
right was to obstruct regular seasonal transfers of water, the no damage principle 
would still apply. Again" where the over-supply of instream rights was lowering the 
aggregate economic value of a water resource) the Department of Conservation 
would be under pressure to dispose of unwanted instream rights. 
4.6 Pollution 
It has not been possible within the context of this study to examine pollution issues 
in depth. The mining privilege system of water allocation made few provisions with 
respect to pollution. Where discharges detrimentally affected other consumptive 
users, with the exception of town water supplies, parties discharging waste were not 
liable for damage. No constraint was put on the overall volume of pollution 
63 Livingston M L and Miller T A. 1986. A framework for analysing the impact of Western 
Instream Water Rights on Choice Domains Transferability, Externalities and Consumptive 
Use. Land Economics Vol.62 No.3 269-277. 
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permitted in streams. Within the time constraint of this analysis, it has not been 
possible to explore how pollution discharges affected the transferability of 
abstractive rights. Thus the comments below look very generally at how the volume 
of pollution is currently allocated and how this would fit into a market context. 
Today, Water Boards, in conjunction with other government agencies and the public, 
are responsible for setting minimum water quality standards, monitoring water 
quality and delimiting the area of the environment to be marked off for pollution 
discharges. This process essentially defines the boundaries of pollution discharges in 
terms of consumptive use. It also sets the boundaries between user groups. 
Abstractive users could then transfer rights provided such transfers did not damage 
rights to discharge. The administrative method of allocating pollution rights could 
sit comfortably alongside a market process of allocating abstractive rights. 
Alternatively, a market for transferable pollution rights could be developed 
alongside the market for abstractive rights. Water transfers would take place 
between the two markets, either where water was more valuable for abstractive uses 
than the disposal of waste or where the quota for pollution discharge had not been ; 
fully appropriated and waste disposal was the higher valued use. However, the 
market allocation of pollution property rights is still in a very early stage of 
development. In 1981 the Fox River became the first body of water in the United 
States for which transferable pollution rights were issued. A recently completed 
analysis has demonstrated substantial cost savings of pollution abatement were 
achieved. 64 However, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether or not 
similar results could be achieved in New Zealand. 
64 Maloney, M T and Yandle B. 1983. "Building Markets for Tradable Pollution Rights" in 
Water Rights Scarce Resource Allocation. Bureaucracy, and the Environment Ballinger 
Publishing. P 311-312. 
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Periodically, the community could re-assess the size of the environmental domain 
which was to receive pollutants. Where a reduction in the volume of pollution 
permitted was made and transferable rights to pollute had been issued with a right of 
renewal, the community would either have to purchase the rights in the market or 
revoke them and pay compensation. Society as a whole would pay for the reduction 
in pollution. Alternatively, rights could be issued on the basis that if they were 
revoked no compensation was payable. This would reduce the security of the rights 
and hence the incentive to invest in pollution abatement. Where rights were 
cancelled, the cost of pollution abatement would fall on the consumers and producers 
of the offending activity.65 One of the questions which will have to be addressed in 
the review of the resource use statutes is who should bear the burden of pollution 
abatement costs. 
4.7 Water Monopolies 
The location of freshwater resources within watersheds provides an opportunity for 
their monopoly ownership to develop. The monopoly which would develop would be a 
bilateral monopoly between the monopolist, most likely to be an irrigation company, 
and the community of water users in the catchment. Since the number of irrigators 
is unlikely to be large, they could band together and force the monopolist to sell 
water at its short-run marginal cost, hence expropriating the capital invested in 
delivery systems. Alternatively, the monopoly company could stand fast and 
attempt to charge a monopoly priC"e for delivery services. The situation is highly 
unstable and is unlikely to persist. 
65 The exact incidence of the distribution of abatement costs between producers and 
consumers would depend on the relative elasticities of supply and demand. 
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Indeed, experience with irrigation companies in Central Otago and California 
suggests the bilateral monopoly problem either won I t develop, or if it does, it will 
eventually breakdown into common ownership. In the case of the Cromwell 
development company which supplied irrigation to farmers for the first three 
decades of this century, farmers successfully petitioned the State to take it over.66 
Farmers have then managed, on virtually all the government irrigation schemes in 
Central, to keep the price of water well below its real value.57 Currently the 
government is investigating ways in which the schemes can be transferred to farmers 
which will ensure the State gets a return on the capital invested. The Schemes will 
then dissolve into common ownership. The history of mutual irrigation companies in 
California also suggests vertical integration between the company and farmers will 
develop rather than a monopoly situation.58 Rather than legislate against the 
potential development of monopolies, it is better to wait and see if such legislation 
is in fact necessary. 
4.8 Treaty of Waitangi 
It is possible that the ownership of some water resources may rest with the Maori 
people. Indeed, the 1967 Water Soil and Conservation Act only vests rights to the 
use of water in the crown. In traditional Maori society tribes could own the bed of 
the river or lal<e. It is possible, successful claims for lakes or rivers may be lodged 
66 per. com Terry Hearn 
67 Carstens (1984) Irrigation in Central Otago HWD Internal Report. 
68 Private long term contractual arrangement between farmer and mutual irrigation 
companies provided a solution to the monopoly problem. See Rodney T Smith. The Economic 
Determinents and Consegl,lences of Private and Public Ownership of local Irrigation facilities 
in Anderson T l et ~. 1983 Water Rights Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and the 
Environment, Ballinger Publishing. 
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before the Waitangi Tribunal. Such claims would not be inconsistent with the 
development of a water market in New Zealand. Successful claims would simply 
result in the transfer of property rights to their rightful owners. Furthermore, 
ownership would enable the Maori people to protect aspects of their cultural 
heritage related to water use. 
4.9 Surrunary: Policy Recommendations 
The central question the discussion has addressed is: what is the most appropriate 
property structure for a water market in New Zealand? Underlying this core 
question is another: what, if any, rationale is there for central government 
involvement in the management of water resources within the context of a market 
setting? 
First, dealing with the second question, there appears to be good reason for central 
government to play an active role in a water market. This need arises because of 
the public goods aspect of instream rights. Instream rights suffer from the free 
rider problem and are thus likely to be undersupplied by the market. If their 
allocation was left purely to regional water boards because of the Board's regional 
perspective, the national interest component in instream rights is likely to be 
undervalued. Also, because instream rights may interfere with the transferability of 
consumptive rights, regionally elected Boards would be likely to attempt to minimise 
their impact on consumptive rights by allocating them mainly at head waters or river 
mouths. The provision of instream rights could be best served by the Department of 
Conservation responding to changing community values by buying or selling instream 
rights. 
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The potential for transfers to produce third party impairment, even where transfers 
are delimited on the basis of consumption, suggests a role for a public agency in 
overseeing exchanges of water. The alternative, a judicial process, is likely to 
I 
produce larger transaction costs. Courts are not familiar with the technical issues 
generated by watershed dynamics. Water Boards) with their role in monitoring 
catchments) are well placed to resolve disputes quickly and thus facilitate water 
transfers. 
This section has attempted to fit the earlier examination of the theoretical 
literature and the findings from the empirical analysis of the mining privilege system 
into the framework of the New Zealand environment. Several provisional policy 
recommendations on what would be the most appropriate property right and 
institutional structure for a water market in New Zealand can now be made. These 
provisional policy recommendations are listed below: 
transfers of water should be defined on the basis of consumptive use. 
"1unappropriated" water is held in Crown ownership; 
the ongoing process of water allocation is based on prior appropriation 
with individuals bidding for rights to unappropriated water; 
through a notification and objection process Water Boards could 
resolve disputes arising out of transfers - appeal would lie to the 
Planning Tribunal and then the Courts; 
minimum flows set by Water Boards would be given to the Department 
of Conservation as the initial stock of instream rights. 111e 
Department could supplement this stock with future purchases. 
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a limited interpretation of the no damage principle could be used. This 
would ensure the purchase of instream rights was not unnecessarily 
obstructed by potential effects to the transferability of consumptive 
rights. 
The policy recommendations are provisional because as yet the cost of introducing 
such refol1TIs has not been evaluated against the benefits suggested in the report. 
For example, the introduction of prior appropriation in areas where water resources 
have been over-allocated might involve the revocation of existing rights. Social 
costs would then be produced as water resources were re-allocated and/or 
appropriators were compensated. It has been beyond the scope of this report to 
evaluate the social cost of introducing the market structure suggested in this 
section. The policy recommendations are provisional in the sense that further 
research has to demonstrate that the costs of introducing such a market structure 
are exceeded by the benefits before the recommendations lose their provisional 
status. 
5.0 Concluding Comments: A Cautionary Note on Equity and Efficiency 
It was argued, in the second section of the report, that the introduction of fully 
transferable water rights in Central Otago would increase the efficiency and equity 
of water resource use. It is likely equity and efficiency gains would be greatest 
where water has a high scarcity value; in water short areas such as Central Otago. 
However, in New Zealand, with the exception of Central Otago, water short areas 
have not adopted prior appropriation. Thus, it is not at all clear that the equity and 
efficiency gains from maldng rights transferable in Central Otago could also be 
achieved in other water short areas, without the introduction of prior appropriation. 
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As poin ted out earlier in the analysis, some Waterboards have responded to scarcity 
by introducing a complex system of water allocation. In times of low flows 
consumptive rights vary according to flow rates, and special conditions on the time 
and place of extraction are attached to individual appropriatoti; rights. It is not at 
all clear, from the analysis in this report, that making water rights transferable in 
such situations, without the introduction of prior appropriation, would improve water 
resource allocation in temlS of efficiency or equity. Indeed, the complex way that 
rights have been arranged may constrain or even preclude trade. If the introduction 
of a water market in New Zealand is to be considered as a serious policy option, the 
affect on equity and efficiency from making rights transferable in other water short 
areas needs to be examined. 
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1.0 Central Otago: History and Envirorunent 
Central Otago has a unique terrain and climate. It consists of a series of basins 
enclosed on all sides by rugged ranges. The basins receive an average between 250 
and 600 mm of rainfall a year. The rainfall is highly variable and the cold dry 
winters and the hot dry summers mean much of it is lost through evaporation. 
Valley basin areas seldom receive sufficient rainfall to maintain pasture growth. 
The Clutha River and its major tributary the Kawarau River run through the basin 
areas, however, because of the entrenched nature of the river courses they are 
relatively inaccessible as a water source. Water used for irrigation is drawn from 
tributaries joining the main rivers, or where possible from races which collect water 
at higher altitudes. The cold dry winter followed by a spring snow smelt and a long 
hot summer, produce highly variable stream flows. 
Water was allocated on the basis of prior appropriation. The simplicity of this 
allocative mechanism, made the rapid exploitation of the water resource possible. 
Between 1860 and 1871 most of the water in the Clutha River tributaries was 
claimed by gold miners. They often worked throughout the year, fully using peak 
spring flows. The state responded to the water shortage by subsidising the 
development of water supply schemes. Private companies and the Mines Department 
built storage facilities and water races, in order to sell water to miners for sluicing 
purposes. The water was never intended to be used for irrigation purposes. 1 
Irrigation in Central Otago began in 1873 when the Warden! s Court granted a water 
right for the irrigation of vegetables. The Warden! s Court administered the 
allocation of water resources in mining districts. The issue of a right for irrigation 
For a detailed discussion of the historical conflict over water use between miners and 
farmers see Hearn T. J. Land, Water and Gold in Central Otago 1861 - 1921. Some 
aspects of resource use Policy and Conflict. PHD Geography. Otago University 1981, 
Chapter 4, 
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purposes marked a major change in the policy of the Court. Before this grant the 
water resource was the sole domain of mining industry. However, it was not until 
after the turn of the century that the rapid development of irrigation began. By 
then the mining industry was in a decline and large volumes of water were released. 
The State purchased key water rights and developed community irrigation schemes. 
A number of irrigation schemes were also developed by private companies.2 
1.1 The Warden's Court: Administering Water Allocation 
The Warden I s Court held jurisdiction over all matters arising from the operation of 
water rights. Before the turn of the century Wardens were appointed by the 
Governor, passing an Order in Council. Mining acts later than 1891 do not stipulate 
how the Warden I s Court was constituted. However, as the Warden was often the 
Resident Magistrate and within the Warden t s Court jurisdiction Wardens held powers 
equivalent to a Resident Magistrate, it is possible Wardens were appointed in the 
same marmer as other Magistrates. They heard applications for, and objections 
against, the granting of Water rights. Wardens also heard all litigation concerning 
contracts, torts, and disputes relating specifically to mining. In 1898, with the 
increasing use of water for irrigation, the jurisdiction of the Court was extended to 
include all disputes relating to mining privileges, whether or not the parties were 
engaged in mining operations. 3 
Most water rights were issued as water race licences 4 which often conferred 
statutory rights of easement across Crown or private property. The compensation of 
land owners or others detrimentally affected by the grant, or exercise of a water 
race right was provided for by all mining acts. A notice of an applicant' s intention 
2 Engelbrecht. Rayds, Tavendale and Co. limited farm management consultants Ashburton. 
Survey Report on Irrigation Charges. Water Quotas and Scheme Management in the Older 
Central Otago Irrigation Schemes p2-5. Also see Hearn supra note 30. 
3 See S.102 Mines Act 1877. 5261 Mining Act 1891, 5254 Mining Act 1898. 
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to construct a water race or vary the conditions of a water right had to be posted 
locally and in the Gazette. People whose interests could be affected, usually land 
owners and other water right holders, had a specified time in which they could object 
to the proposed grant. Initially it was up to the applicant and parties affected by a 
proposal to arrive at a settlement. If agreement between the race licence applicant 
and parties affected could not be struck, it was settled by arbitration, or by the 
Warden working in conjunction with assessors. Where the Warden considered an 
objection to be frivolous, costs could be awarded against the objector.5 
In the late nineteenth century the power of the Warden's Court was extended, and 
appellant channels to superior courts were restricted and more tightly defined. The 
first consolidation of mining legislation. the 1866 Gold Fields Act, made provision to 
appeal to the District Court or where there was none to the Supreme Court. The 
1877 Mines Act made decisions of the appellate court final and conclusive, and 
provided that, where appeals were on fact alone, or fact and law, they were to be by 
way of rehearing. It also stipulated that the appellant was not entitled to costs of 
appeal unless the Court felt there were 'special circumstances'. This contrasted 
sharply to the 1866 Gold Fields Act which allowed for costs to be awarded as to the 
Judge's discretion. In 1898 appeals on fact from a summary conviction not 
exceeding £5 were disallowed. The same act removed the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction, over all matters within the Warden's jurisdiction, except where the 
cause of action affected the title to land. In effect this meant the Supreme Court 
4 Water rights could be issued under a dam licence, a drainage area licence and a tail 
rare licence. These water rights however, did not provide the holder with the right 
to divert and sell water, as did a water race licence. 
5 See section 11 1866 Goldfields Act, section 98(4) 1898 Mining Act and sections 118. 
1998(15) Mining Act 1926 on compensation, and see s(117), s(168) 1926 on Wardens 
powers to award costs. 
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could not direct the Warden! s Court with respect to procedural irregularities. 
Before the turn of the century opportunities for appeal from the Warden's Court 
were gradually restricted and the Court gained additional powers.6 
1.2 Specification and Variation of Rights 
Each water right specified the quantity of water taken in terms of the amount 
diverted, the purpose for which the water was used, the tenure of the licence, the 
exact path of the race and any conditions stipulated by the Warden. Licences were 
issued for periods ranging between 15 and 42 years, depending on which mining act 
they were granted under. Before the tum of the century there was a nominal annual 
rental. All water rights held an automatic right of renewal when the term they were 
issued for expired. Since the water was allocated on the basis of prior appropriation 
the date of issue of the licence established who had prior right in times of low 
flows. 7 However no right conferred priority against an individual requiring water for 
stock or domestic purposes. The special status given to domestic or stock watering 
rights meant individuals were not obligated to acquire water rights for either 
purpose. In many cases farmers and other settlers simply used water running through 
their property, for stock watering or domestic purposes,S 
6 With respect to the Court's appellant structure see Hines Act 1877. 5.152, Goldfields 
Act 5.81, 5.82, 5.93 Mining Act 1898 5.282, 5.285. With respect to the jurisdiction 
and additional powers of the Warden's Court see Hawkins versus the Slate River 
Sluicing Company (1902) 21 N.Z.L.R. 517 and see Mining Act 1898 5.5, 5.254(13), 5294, 
5254. 
7 Mines Act 1877 5.31. Although the priority of right to water based on chronological 
claim was not explicitly set out in the Golds Fields Act 1866 it was in operation as 
is evident from the Warden's Court registrars. 
8 Appendix One (1.3.3) contains an example of where over one hundred settlers were using 
water for domestic purposes without water rights. 
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The use of water for the disposal of tailings came into conflict with the use of water 
for domestic use and other purposes. In accordance with the dominant role of the 
mining industry, early mining acts made provision for the Governor to set aside 
water courses for the disposal of tailings. The liabilities of parties discharging 
tailings was refined in 1891. The 1891 Mining Act stipulated that water right holders 
could not claim damages against individuals disposing of tailings. This was provided 
that the miners discharge point, was at least two chains above the intake point of 
another water right holders race. In 1898 the distance was extended to five chains. 
However, where the disposal of tailings came into conflict with water used for 
domestic purposes the interests of the mining industry took second place. Miners 
were not allowed to I pollute! water taken by county council races for domestic 
supply. t Pollution I was not defined in the mining acts. 9 
It was not until 1877 that a water race right could be granted for irrigation purposes 
under a mining act. 10 However, such a right was issued in conjunction with a water 
right granted for mining purposes.ll An amendment in 1903 made, subject to 
ministerial approval, provision for a change of purpose.12 This was usually granted 
on the recommendation of the warden. The change of purpose also carried the 
proviso that the licence would still carry the same priority. However, half of the 
water entitlement was to be made available to lower priority licences for the 
purpose of mining. A change of purpose to irrigation would entail additional 
consumption of water, as when the water was used for irrigation return flows would 
be reduced. Thus the provision was designed to protect other right holder's 
interests, primarily those of miners. 
9 See s.92 Mines Act 1877, S.105(12) Mining Act 1891 and s.103, 104 Mining Act 1898. 
10 The first legislation to make water available specifically for irrigation was the 
Otago Wastel ands Act 1972. Thi s allowed the water rights to be granted to Central 
Otago farmers on the same basis as rights issued for mining purposes. However this 
did not lesson the conflict over water resources between miners and pastoralists as 
most of the available water had already been appropriated. (see Hearn P. 297.) 
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The 1866 Goldfields Act did not make explicit provisions for the variation of water 
race rights, however, such alterations were provided for by later mining acts.13 The 
licencee could alter or extend the course of a water race. In accordance with the 
principle of prior appropriation an increase in the quantity of water diverted was not 
deemed to be an alteration of an existing licence. An application to extend or alter 
the course of a water race was treated as if it were a new application for a mining 
privilege. Thus any alteration of rights was open to objection from land owners and 
people whose interest would be affected by the grant. The Warden held the 
discretion as to whether the alteration was to be endorsed on the original licence or 
whether it was to be issued under a new licence. 
1.3 Right of Transfer 
Water rights were deemed to be the private property of the licencee, and could be 
sold or assigned to other individuals. They still hold this status today.14 The right 
of transfer, however, has had several restrictions placed on it over time. The first 
major restriction appeared in 1910. Transfers which would result in the aggregation 
of more than 20 heads15 of water to anyone individual were disallowed, 
11 Mines Act 1877 s.31. Mining Act 1886 s.141. Water rights were issued to either 
holders of miners licence or people engaged in the industry. Water rights issued for 
irrigation, prior to the turn of the century were granted to miners for the purpose of 
mining and irrigation. 
12 Mining Amendment Act 1903 s.5. 
13 As outlined in the text the Warden held a wide range of powers. He could almost 
certaint1y have varied the terms of water rights. See the Mining Act 1877 section 11 
for the earliest reference to the variation of water rights. Alterations to rights 
are in fact listed in the court journals prior to 1877. 
14 From as early as 1866 mining privileges were deemed to be chattel interests. They 
could be "inherited, assigned, transferred, seized and sold under any writ of fieri 
facias or other writ of execution or warrant." Mining privileges in respect to water 
still hold this status today. (see footnotes 22 and 23). 
15 One head is equal to 100m 3/h of water. 
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except with the consent of the Minister.16 Transfers were further constrained in 
1919 when an amendment prevented, except with the consent of the Minister, the 
transfer of a water race licence which would result in the use of water on "land 
other than that for which it was originally granted" ,17 In addition, the total 
allowable aggregation of water resulting from any transfer was lowered to ten 
heads. The restrictions on transfers were put in place in order to prevent the 
development of monopolies in water ownership. 
The most recent act of parliament to specifically deal with mining privileges in 
respect to water, the Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1971, does not 
cite the above constraints on the transfer of water race rights. However, the ability 
to transfer water separate to land has been severely restricted. Section 14(a) states 
that unless otherwise provided for in the principal act the holder of a current mining 
privilege shall, "not alter the intake of the water, or use for diverting the water any 
race other than the race authorised by the privilege." Section 24B of the principal 
Act, the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, provides for the variation of rights. 
However, any variation is treated as an application for a new right, and as a board 
right, the new water right would have no priority over other water rights. It would 
be worthless in comparison to its former status as a mining privilege. The transfer 
of water rights separate from land has effectively been constrained by the 1971 
amendment. 
Although the transfer of rights to water in isolation of the land associated with the 
initial granting of the licence is constrained, water right holders are otherwise free 
to trade water. All the mining acts carried the provision that a licensee of a water 
race could" .... by means of such race, to take, divert, and use a specified number of 
16 Mining Act 1926 section 178. 
17 Mining Amendment Act 1910, No 78, clause 17. 
18 Section 109, Mining Act 1926. 
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sluice heads of water from any water course on or through or adjoining such land, in 
order to supply, sell, or dispose of such water .... " .18 Until 1971 the water could be 
sold for a wide range of purposes including any industrial pursuits, irrigation, 
domestic use and any other purpose authorised by the Minister. The Water and Soil 
Conservation Amendment 1971 restricted the sale of water to the purpose specified 
in the licence.19 
In addition to the sale of water, it has always been possible to lease rights to water 
or transfer water rights among land owners associated with a particular race. 
Historically, as land was divided into smaller units, so were the water rights 
associated with the land. It is common today to have several water rights attached 
to a particular race running through a number of properties. Exchanges of shares in 
the initial water right is possible among these property owners. It is also possible 
through the adjustment of priorities among water right holders to lease water along 
a watercourse. However, since it is not permitted to take water in excess of that 
specified in a licence the leasing of water is restricted to the adjustment of water 
deficits in licencee's water rights.20 
1.4 Forfeiture, Cancellation and the Right to Protection 
In addition to market exchanges, the forfeiture of rights was another means of 
transferring water among appropriators. A suit for the forfeiture or the cancellation 
of a water right, or any portion of, could be initiated by other right holders. The 
grounds for cancellation or forfeiture varied. Generally, however, if the licensee did 
not observe the conditions attached to the right or the right was unused for a 
specified period of time, the licence could be forfeited or cancelled. Under a suit 
for cancellation the claimant was claiming for the possession of the right 
19 Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1971 5.4. 
20 See section 121(g)(f) Mining Act 1926. 
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whereas a right which was forfeited was open for public application. Since under 
both forms of suit the licence would lose its former priority status water was 
released for use for all other right holders. 21 If the cost of litigation did not exceed 
the market price of water right, holders would have an incentive to file suits of 
forfeiture. 
To avoid forfeiture or cancellation the holder of a water right could apply for 
protection. Protection was limited to a period not exceeding two months in the 
Mines Act 1877, however, the grolli1ds for protection were not stipulated. The Act 
also made provision for a fine in lieu of forfeiture. The Mining Act 1898 
strengthened provisions for protection. Broad grounds were defined and the period 
over which it could be claimed was extended. Later acts and amendments atso 
strengthened the provisions for protection by broadening the grounds on which it 
could be claimed.22 
Water race licences could be revoked or abandoned by passing of law. A race could 
be deemed abandoned where it had been entirely unused or unused for its specified 
purpose for a continuous period of 12 months. A licence could be revoked by the 
state where the water was required for public use, however the licensee had to be 
23 
compensated. 
1.5 Instream Rights 
On the application of the occupier or owner of land, within three chains of, or 
adjoining a water course, the Warden could order, for general use, a quantity of 
21 See section 86 Mines Act 1877, s.117, 2113 Mining Act 1891. 
22 See section 86 Mines Act 1877 s.130-35 Mining Act 1898, section 33 Mining Amendment 
Act 1914. section 4 Mining Amendment Act 1924, s.37 Mining Amendment Act 1949. 
23 1908 S 188, 185, 187. 
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water not exceeding two sluice heads to flow in a watercourse. With increasing 
pressure on water resources towards the turn of the century the quantity was 
reduced to one sluice head. The statutory definition of the term general use meant 
the water was not available for irrigation or mining.24 In the first decade of this 
century, as irrigation requirements put increasing pressure on the water resource, 
the Court revoked many instream rights25 A landowner or occupier could also 
request a I reasonable I flow of water for domestic use or stock watering. Under 
mining legislation what constituted 'reasonable I use was decided by the Warden. 
Currently this discretion lies with Water Boards. 26 
1.6 Crown Water Rights 
From about the turn of the century, in order to promote an equitable distribution of 
water and the development of irrigation in Central Otago the Crown applied for and 
purchased key water rights. Major purchases of rights in 1906 were used to supply 
the Gollaway and Ida Valley irrigation schemes. The Earnscleugh irrigation scheme 
is based entirely on rights purchased from a mining company in 1920. The majority 
of the State I s irrigation schemes today in Central Otago depend on mining privilege 
water rights for their operation in times of low flow. 
In order to facilitate the development of irrigation and protect the State's interests 
the Crown made several important amendments to the law. Among these were the 
restrictions on the transfer of water rights outlined previously. The ability of the 
24 Instream flows were most likely to be used by miners for domestic purposes (per com 
Terry Hearn). Thus these were not strictly instream rights. However since domestic 
use would entail limited extraction as instream flows would be required for washing, 
possibly waste disposal, and extraction would be periodic with large return flows, 
they are treated by this analysis as instream rights. 
25 Per Com. Terry Hearn. 
26 See section 16(2) Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1971. 
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Minister to scrutinise exchanges meant the state could prevent transfers which were 
contrary to its interests. When the government acquired a water right and changed 
its purpose from mining to irrigation it was not subject to the provison that half the 
water should be made available to miners who held inferior rights. An amendment in 
1920 provided that a water right could not be renewed until two months after the 
date of application for renewal. The state used this time to review all applications. 
Where a water right was required by the Crown it could be taken; however, the 
licensee was entitled to compensation. Under the Public Works Act 1908 Crown 
water rights wer~ deemed to be not liable to forfeiture. This was expanded on by 
the Mining Amendment Act 1915 which included the provision that Crown water 
rights could not be cancelled, revoked or declared abandoned, and in 1919 Crown 
rights were deemed not to expire with the effluxion of time. These amendments 
give the Crown the opportunity to closely monitor and control the reallocation of the 
Otago water resource and give Crown rights a privileged position with respect to 
h . h 27 ot er water fIg ts. 
27 Mining Act 1926 S97. 
Mining Amendment 1920. 
Mining Amendment 1915 S3. 
Mining Amendment 1919 S14. 
The State could also secure water released on the surrender of a water right, see 
Section 3 of the Mining Amendment Act 1920. For a more indepth discussion of how the 
State went about securing key water rights and protecting its interests see Hearn 
p97-102. 
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2.0 Sources of Data 
Data, taken from the Warden I s Court journals at Blacks, 1 is used to examine modes 
of transfer and the likelihood of third party impairment. There were, at the height 
of mining activity, fifteen Warden Courts in Central Otago. Blacks is one of six key 
Courts.2 Case history which is representative of the kind of litigation which was 
common is examined. 3 The case history is supplemented by information drawn from 
Ministry of Works files and National Archive records. 
The data covers the period between 1866 and 1926. This was the only period for 
which extensive data is available. However, because of the economic 
transformations which occurred over this interval, the data provides us with fertile 
ground to test the hypothesis that water transfers separate from land would be likely 
to cause third party impairment. The period saw the development of mining prior to 
the turn of the century and then the transfer of water to farmers. The transfer of 
water between different user groups with differing return flow co-efficients 
provides us with an excellent opportunity to examine possible third party impairment. 
The Court journals include the Warden's Registrar of Applications and the Plaints Book 
for the years 1866 to 1926. These are held at the Hocken library in Dunedin. 
2 per com. T J Hearn and L W Hinchey. 
3 The case history was selected for me by T J Hearn. He has completed a Phd in 
Geography whi ch analyses resource use policy and conflict in Central Otago, between 
1861 and 1921. The cases are held at the Hocken library along with Warden's Court 
Records. However, particular cases would be almost impossible to find as they have 
not been catalogued. Terry Hearn and myself have copies of all the relevant cases. 
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2.1 Pattern of Water Right Transfers 
As is evident from the many transactions recorded on water right licences, it has 
been common to sell rights or subdivide rights in conjunction with the transfer of 
land. Such sales are recorded as assignments on water right certificates. Mortgages 
of the water rights to finance companies are also listed. In one of the certificates, 
reproduced in Appendix four, shares in the water right as low as 1/84 are recorded. 
Although it has been common to sell water rights in conjunction with land, it has not 
been common to transfer rights separate from land. 4 One of the reasons for this is 
that. in Central Otago Water rights are often worth far more than the associated 
land. Gillies (1975), in a submission concerning the proposed phasing out of mining 
privileges, argued that the chattel status of the water rights allowed them to: 
"be traded towards the land from which they would give the best return, or 
more probably since the land was practically valueless without water, allowed 
the potentially better land to be traded towards the higher priority licences." 5 
It was often economic to buy better land and then construct races to transport water 
to the new property. Alterations and extensions of races are common on water race 
certificates. 6 
4 per com. Brian Mooney. Mr Mooney has audited the records of water rights issued as 
mining privileges. In his present job he oversees all matters arising from mining 
privilege water rights in Central Otago. The copy of water right certificate in 
Appendix Two was reproduced by Mr Mooney. The records were audited between 1969 and 
1971 in response to the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act. 
5 Gillies A. J. Former Chief Engineer Otago Catchment Board. Paper titled Mining 
Privileges. Held at Otago Catchment Board. P.2. 
6 per com. Brian Mooney. 
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Altematively a water right holder could purchase better land elsewhere in the 
catchment. The water could then be transported to the land via a change in the 
point of intake. The water right holder could also sell the licence to another land 
owner in the catchment, conditional on a change in the point of intake being 
granted. However the transfer of water separate from land was uncommon. As is 
evident from court records and case history attempts to alter the point of intake 
were commonly objected too. 
2.2 Court Records 
Data from the Blacks Warden 1 s Court between 1866 and 1921, grouped in five year 
intervals, are listed in table one. The dashes represent periods for which data was 
not available. The first two rows record the number of applications for alterations 
in points of intake and changes in purpose, from mining to irrigation. The number of 
applications objected to is also recorded for each interval. The next two rows 
contain the number of applications for protection and suits of forfeiture or 
cancellation. Suits for forfeiture or cancellation are recorded jointly as these both 
achieved the same purpose. The Warden often recorded these suits as suits for 
forfeiture and cancellation. 
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Table One 
DATA FROM THE WARDENS COURT AT BLACKS 
1866 1871 1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1966 1911 1916 
1871 1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 
Alteration 
Point of Intake 3 10 5 8 11 25 3 10 2 12 
Number 
Objected too 3 3 2 5 7 17 2 4 8 
Change of 20 4 35 
Purpose 
Objections 0 3 24 
Forfei turel 9 22 2 12 24 30 12 9 5 3 3 
Cancellation 
Protection 6 16 3 3 13 4 7 16 
In total there are 131 forfeitures or cancellations recorded between 1866 and 1921. 
There are two marked high points in the number of forfeitures over the period. TIle 
first appears for the 5-year period prior to 1876 in which there is a total of 22 
forfeitures. This is well over double the number of forfeitures for the previous 5-year 
period. In the 5 years following 1876 the number dramatically declines to 2. A similar 
fluctuation is found in the last decade of the 19th century where forfeitures peak at 30 
before declining to 12 over the next five year intervaL 
The fluctuations in the number of forfeitures can be explained by reference to the 
degree of water scarcity and changes in statutory provisions. By 1871 most of the 
"available" water had been allocated.7. This could explain the first large increase 
7 Hearn T J Land. Water and Gold in Central Otago 1861-1921. Some aspects of resource use 
Po 1 icy and Confli ct. Phd Geography, Otago Uni vers ity 1981. Chapter 4. P297. The 
reason the allocatable supply of water is referred to by the qualifier 'available'. is 
that Central Otago as considerable supplies of water which are inaccessible. The Clutha 
River, and its major tributary the Kawarau River, have established entrenched courses 
making them relatively inaccessible as a source of water. 
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in forfeitures. The dramatic decline was probably in response to the provision in the 
1877 Mines Act which allowed for a fine in lieu of forfeiture. 8 Until the grounds for 
a fine in lieu of forfeiture were formulated, by case history, individuals would have 
been unwilling to file expensive suits. The second peak, prior to the turn of the 
century, corresponds to a greatly increased demand for water. Large lease hold 
lands were subdivided and the mining industry went through an enormous 
expansion. 9 The subsequent rapid decline in forfeitures was probably a response to 
statutory provisions in 1898. These extended the grounds for protection and provided 
for a fine in lieu of forfeiture where "special circumstances" existed. 10 
Protection was a pre-emptive defence against forfeiture. The Warden did not 
always state whether protection pertained to mining claims or water races. Only 
applications where the Warden stated they referred to water races were counted. 
Thus the number is likely to be an underestimation. However, the figures indicate 
individuals responded to the increased threat of forfeiture by taking out protection. 
This is particularly evident in the five-year interval following the provisions to 
extend the grounds for protection put in place in 1898. 11 
8 See S.86 Mines Act 1877 
9 Between 1878 and 1885 leasehold land totalling 6,944,126 acres, in Southland and 
Otago, became due to expire. For a detailed description of the breakup of large 
1 easeho 1 d over the 1880s and 1890s see Hearn Chapter II. supra note 7. See Parce 11 
J. C. Heart of the Desert Whitcoulls Publishers (1976) Chapter 14, for a discussion on 
boom of mining industry in the 1890s. 
10 The Wardens Court interpreted the special circumstances listed in S.157 of The Mining 
Act 1898 as extending to a shortage of capital or labour. See Ewing" Vs The 
Scandinavian Water Race Company 24.NZLR. 271. 
11 Mining Act 1898 s.130-35. 
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An alternative means to forfeiture of transferring water, separate to land, was via a 
market purchase. However, rights could only be transferred in this manner if 
permission was granted to alter the point of intake. The alterations listed in figure one 
refer only to applications which sought to divert water into another race, in a different 
location along the stream. Simple alterations in the points of intake were excluded. 
These could have referred to shifts in intake as a result of floods washing out the head 
of a race. Because private transactions are not recorded in the Wardens I journals the 
figures cannot be used to indicate the extent of market transfers. Some of the 
alterations could have been applications by companies or individuals to reallocate 
water among their own races. 
There are nearly 90 such alterations recorded. The number of alterations was not 
available over one 5-year interval. It appears forfeiture was a slightly more common 
way of transferring water. Again data peaks prior to the tum of the century 
corresponding to the increased demand for water. This period saw the amalgamation 
of many smaller mining companies into larger companies. 12 Thus, it is possible many 
of these alterations in the point of intake reflect market exchanges. 
Also the peak in alterations corresponds to the sharp downturn in forteitures between 
1896 and 1901. As mentioned this period saw provisions for protection and a fine in 
lieu of forfeiture extended. Thus, the rise in the number of potential market 
exchanges appears to be in response to retrictions imposed on the opportunity to file 
successful suits of forfeiture. Indeed, in the 25 years following 1896 there were 52 
changes in the point of intake in comparison to 32 forfeitures, whereas, in the 30 years 
prior to 1896 forfeitures exceeded alterations by 62. When restrictions were imposed 
on forfeiture individuals responded by more frequently using market exchanges to 
transfer water separate from land. 
12 Hearn, supra note 9. 
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On average 70 percent of applications to transfer water via points of intake were 
objected to. This indicates transfers were likely to cause third party impainnent. It 
was not possible to examine the individual case history of each application. Thus the 
exact extent of the affect objections had on transferability cannot be ascertained. 
However, in that objections were fairly persistent the Courts must have satisfied 
many of the objector I s claims. Third party imp ainn en t was an obstacle to the 
market transfer of water separable from land. 
From 1903 onwards it was possible to apply for a change of purpose from mining to 
irrigation. In the two years following 1903 there were 20 such applications none of 
which were objected too. The number then dramatically drops to 5 applications over 
the next decade and then climbs to a peak of 35 between the years 1916 to 1920. In 
contrast to the earlier applications the majority of later applications are objected 
to. The disparity in the number of objections between the later and earlier periods 
can be explained by reference to the nature of the applications. The majority of the 
earlier applications were placed by individuals, along small streams or tributaries, 
while the later applications pertained to large water rights held by companies.13 
The affect on third parties, via changes in consumption diversion ratios, would be 
greater where changes in use involved large volumes of water. Also where rights 
were situated along small tributaries the affect of such changes would not 
necessarily, be easily perceived by right holders on the main river stream. In fact 
many small rights, along tributaries, were used illegally for irrigation purposes 
without ever being challenged.14 
13 per com. Terry Hearn. Th is was also evi dent as I surveyed the Court records. In 
some of the latter applications companies attempted to change six or seven rights to 
irrigation ;n one application. 
14 This evident from Ministry of Works and Development communications regarding water 
rights. See Reports on Private Applications for Water Rights Summary of MOWD 
Alexandra file No. 33. Summarised at District Office 1981. 
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2.3 Case History 
2.3.1 Alteration in the Point of Intake 
On 12 February 1897 an application was lodged in the Wardens Court at Clyde by a 
miner named John Magnus. He wished to shift his point of intake about half a mile 
down stream. He argued the alteration was desirable as snow lay for a shorter 
period dowIlstream and this would allow him to utilise water earlier in summer. The 
application was objected to by farmers who held water rights further down the 
catchment. 
The objectors argued that their rights were seldom if ever fully supplied in summer. 
That there was, " ... little water ever available at the present head of the applicants 
race but there would be much more at the proposed new point." They argued this 
would occur because several tributaries joined the creek between the then present 
head and the proposed head. If the alteration was granted they felt their rights 
would be "seriously prejudiced". 
The Warden ruled against the proposed shift in the point of intake. He though it was 
a " ... deliberate plan whereby, under the wing of the Warden and the Warden's Court, 
the applicants may get the benefit of water, the right of use of which is vested in 
others ... " If property rights to water had also been defined in terms of historical 
consumptive use this dispute could have been avoided. The Warden could have 
granted the right to shift the point of intake conditional on an appropriate reduction 
in the quantity diverted. 
The case illustrates another issue raised by poorly defined property rights. 
Individuals are provided with an incentive to cause third party impairment where 
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property rights to water are delineated solely on the basis of diversion. John Magnus 
probably knew the shift in the point of his intake would gain him access to additional 
water. If Magnus could have managed to persuade the Warden of his case he could 
have obtained water at a premium price. 
2.3.2 Application for Protection 
In 1912 John Ewing, a hydraulic mining engjneer, applied for protection for two 
water race rights. Ewing held prior rights which consumed most of the summer time 
flow in the Dunstan Creek. He applied on the grounds that he required time in which 
to survey a course for a race extension, and negotiate with farmers, through whose 
properties the race would pass. The extension to the race meant the water would 
have been exported out of the watershed. Ewing who had previously sold his water 
to miners intended to sell the water to farmers. 
Three mining companies objected to Ewing's application for protection. They 
argued that a grant for protection was not necessary to enable Ewing to carry out 
the actions cited as grounds for protection. And that in any case" ... the water was 
required for mining purposes in the vicinity" the Warden ruled against the 
application for protection. 
However the Warden, in his judgment, does not refer to the objector I s claims but to 
the needs of farmers in the valley. He argues the export of water to sell it to 
farmers in another valley was not equitable. He states that since " ... the whole 
country ... " was "sheep carrying the water should be retained in the valley to which it 
belongs. That the grant of water "to few people at the expense to others" as 
occurred in the Goldfields led to " .. .large areas being turned into wastes, or at least, 
giving some areas a great advantage over others". His statement reflects a general 
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sentiment in the community. It was commonly felt, especially among fanners, that 
the mining privilege system led to an inequitable distribution of water. 15 
The case illustrates the obstacles to investment opportunities generated by poorly 
defined property rights. In applying for protection Ewing had a hidden agenda. As is 
evident from objections to changes in purpose Ewing would have encountered major 
obstacles when he applied to use the right for irrigation. If the Warden had granted 
Ewing protection, on the grounds stipulated in his application, the Warden would 
have sanctioned a change in purpose. In fact the Warden commented that if he had 
granted protection it It ••• could not fail to be regarded as in some measure a sanction 
to the intention of the change in purpose, and must embarrass the Warden who would 
have to deal with the matter. It In applying for protection Ewing was attempting to 
lower transaction costs by avoiding extensive litigation over a change in purpose. 
2.3.3 Application for Forfeiture 
In October 1919 a suit for forfeiture of water rights held hy Josiah Lane, a Dunedin 
cordial manufacturer, was filed in the Wardens Court at Alexandra. Lane had 
fonnally used the rights for mining and when the gold was exhausted he had 
neglected to apply for a change of purpose to irrigation. He had attempted to sell 
the rights to the Crown. He now intended selling the rights to the Vincent County 
Council, provided he was successful in securing a change of purpose. In order to 
protect his rights from forfeiture he employed a caretaker on the pretence that the 
. h b' t'l' d 16 rlg ts were emg u lIse , 
15 Hearn Chapter 4 supra note 7. 
16 See Memo P W 334 PWD Alex to PWD Dunedin. 14 May 1918 MOWO files supra note 13. 
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The plaintiffs were a farmer and a fruit grower who held lower priority rights. They 
claimed Lane's water rights had not been used for their proper purpose for two 
years. They also managed to get Lane I s former dredgemaster to testify. He said 
Lane had given him instructions to operate the dredge, in order to protect the water 
rights. The Warden ruled in favour of forfeiture. 
However the matter did not stop here. The Vincent City Council had entered into a 
contract with Lane to purchase his rights conditional on a change of purpose being 
granted. The water was being used for domestic purposes by over 100 settlers. It 
was not mandatory to hold rights to water where it was used for domestic purposes; 
no right conferred priority over domestic use. Since the set tlers I rights were 
ill-defined, the forfeiture of Lane I s rights would impose a third party effects on the 
settlers. In order to protect these domestic users the Vincent City Council 
petitioned parliament. The Vincent City Council managed to persuade parliament to 
extend the conditions under which a fine in lieu of forfeiture could be declared. 17 
The Mining Amendment Act 1919 provided that a fine in lieu of forfeiture, 'could be 
declared where it was "unjust and inequitable" to decree forfeiture, or where it was 
in the "public interest" ,18 Lane appealed on the grounds that the forfeiture was in 
the public I s interest. However the Warden, with reference to the retrospective 
nature of the legislation, decided the rights should be forfeited.19 
17 See Hansard 1919 Pg 1054 - 1057. 
18 Mining Amendment Act 1919 s.S. 
19 In his judgment the Warden dryly notes " ... he (Lane) has agreed to sell the water 
rights in question to two individuals who have agreed to vest such rights in the 
Vincent County Council, evidently anticipating the amendment to the Mining Act, and 
with the object of satisfying me that the public would be benefited by my not 
decreeing forfeiture". 
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2.3.4 Change of Purpose 
It is evident from communications in Ministry of Works files that third party 
impairment could be produced by changes purpose. On 5 June 1919 ten people 
applied for a change of purpose from mining to irrigation, industrial and domestic. 
The ten were all located along tributaries of the Manukerikia river. The river 
supplied a government irrigation scheme. The Ministry proceeded to object to the 
proposed changes on the basis that, "If the water is spread on the land instead of 
returning to Manukerikia River by the present sludge channels, the flow available at 
the intake fo the Manuherikia water race will be reduced". The Ministry clearly 
feared that alterations in diversion consumption ratios created by the change in 
purpose would prejudice its water rights. 20 
However the Ministry withdrew its objections. On further investigation, it was 
realised the volumes of water involved were small and the water had been used 
illegally for several years for irrigation. It was considered this would be hard to 
stop. This case supports the argument advanced earlier that small rights located 
along tributaries were more likely to be granted changes of purpose without 
confronting objections. It also supports my conjecture that the data is an 
underestimation of the number of cases heard in the Blacks Court. Although the ten 
cases were heard at Blacks in 1919 between 1916 and 1921 I only found 4 in the 
register. 
20 Application Nos 18 and 19, June-September 1919 MOWD files supra note 13. 
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2.3.5 Petition to Parliament 
Probably the most striking evidence that transfers of water between different user 
groups caused third party impairment comes from a petition to parliament. In 1919 
the Mines and Goalfields committee was petitioned by a group of 22 fanners from 
Central Otago. The fanners were concerned by a proposed amendment to the 
Mining Act. 
The amendment would have allowed the State to acquire rights which were 
abandoned or forfeited. The farmers held water rights dependent on the return flows 
from a prior mining right. The mining company which owned the right had 
successfully applied for protection and wished to sell its rights. The fanners were 
concerned that if the right was eventually abandoned the State would take them over 
and use them for irrigation purposes. 
If the rights were used for irrigation purposes return flow coefficients would have 
been altered at great cost to the fanners. In a hearing. before the 1919 Mines 
Committee, farmer representatives made it abundantly clear that they had invested 
large sums in the construction of races. In their petition, referring to how the 
change of purpose would alter return flows, the farmers state: 
" ... You, sir, know the difference between rights held for mining and those held 
for irrigation, and it is unnecessary to prove to you that we obtain more water 
when prior rights are mining than we should if they were held for irrigation 
because of drainage, leakage, etc. n 
The farmers also had another issue on their agenda. They wanted to amend the 
problems caused by changes in purpose by amending the legislation. They requested 
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that where rights were changed from mining to irrigation such licences should lose 
priority over existing irrigation rights. The self interest motivating this proposal is 
strikingly obvious. The fanners petition and the minutes of their submission to the 
mines committee are reproduced in Appendix Three. 
2.4 Present Water Use Efficiency 
There are at least five different ways to define irrigation efficiencies.21 The 
measure used here is defined as the ratio of water in the plant root zone to total 
water supplied at the fann gate. The relative efficiencies of 5 different irrigation 
teclmiques used in Central Otago are listed in Table two. Alongside these figures 
the percentage of land area they irrigate is recorded. The overall efficiency of 
irrigation in Central Otago is listed as 40 percent. This compares unfavourably with 
a potential efficiency of 75 percent achieved by the use of spray irrigation.22 
Figure Two 
Application Method 
Spray 
Border-Dyke 
Corrugation 
Contouring 
Wild Flooding 
Overall 
CENTRAL OTAGO IRRIGATION 
% Water Use Efficiency* 
60-75 
60-70 
50-60 
40-60 
10-50 
probably less than 40 
% Otago Irrigated Area 
10 
10 
80 
100 
Efficiency here is defined as ratio of water retained in the plant root zone to 
total water supplied at farm gate. 
Above figures from Carstens 'Irrigation in Central Otago', 1984 
All are rough order only. Internal Report MWD R84/19 
21 See Painter D and Carran P What is irrigation efficiency Soil and 
Water Oct1978. 
22 Carstens (1984) Irrigation in Central Otago MWD Internal Report. 
85 
However what appears to be an efficient use of water may not be economically 
viable. Whether or not a particular irrigation technique is economical depends on a 
range of factors. These include the soil type, crop grown prices and reliability of 
water supply. 23 However, it is clear from surveys on water use in Central Otago, 
there are "numerous opportunities ... for efficient and economic sprinkler irrigation 
,,24 
systems ... 
The reasons behind the low efficiency are at least two fold. First government 
subsidisation of community irrigation schemes has meant historically low prices for 
water. This has provided farmers with a disincentive to invest in irrigation 
equipment which would use the water more efficiently.25 Prices are currently being 
re-adjusted to ensure more realistic charges for water. This will provide an 
incentive for farmers to use water more efficiently. In fact, on my field trip to 
Central Otago, I talked to a farmer whose son had invested in spray equipment in 
response to the increased price charged for water. 
The second reason behind the inefficiencies is that risk is shared unequally among 
private water right holders. This was evident from interviews with farmers, 
Catchmen t board staff and Ministry of Works personal. One of the indicators of this 
is that in general only farmers who hold high priority rights, or are on community 
irrigation schemes, can risk investing in spray irrigation equipment. The nature of 
their rights guarantees them a supply of water during the summer months. Without 
an assured water supply investment in irrigation equipment is too risky. Without a 
summer water supply it would lie idle. 
23 Ibidp.7. 
24 Enge 1 brecht, Rayds. Tavenda 1 e and Co. Limited Farm Management Consultants Ashburton. 
Survey Report on Irrigation Charges. Water Quotas and Scheme Management in the Qlder 
Central Otago Irrigation Schemes p.27. 
25 Supra note 21 p.7. 
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In many cases where farmers use spray irrigation, they allocate only a fraction of 
their water supply to this method of irrigation. This is because of the diseconomies 
of scale involved in using spray irrigation equipment. Labour time and costs involved 
in shifting irrigation equipment eventually became prohibitive.26 Clearly if water 
were redistributed, to increase the opportunities available to use spray irrigation, 
total faI.TI1 revenue could be increased. 
There is also preliminary evidence that where farmers use identical irrigation 
techniques, lower priority appropriators use water more efficiently than higher 
priority appropriators. To use water efficiently in Central Otago farmers need to 
apply water as early as possible. Early irrigation maintains maximum pasture growth 
and avoids costly soil moisture deficits.2 7 It was claimed, by a high priority right 
holder who had invested extensively in spray irrigation equipment, that in many 
cases senior appropriators applied water later than junior appropriators. 
26 per com. L W Hinchey (former farmer and Catchment Board member) and G Herlihy (farmer 
at Pataroa. MSC. Agricultural Science). 
27 Engelbrecht rates" it is more economic when predicting forward, to have irrigated when 
it was not requi red because of subsequent ra; nfall, than to have i rri gated when 
subsequent weather conditions determined that it was necessary". Supra note 23 p.25. 
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His suggestion was indirectly supported by comments from farmers, Catchment 
Board staff and Ministry of Works staff. It was widely accepted that a "smart 
fanner", who held a low priority right, could harvest a spring crop by irrigating 
"earlier in the season than most farmers". In fact the Catchment board still issues 
boards rights, which have no priority, to farmers who want to take advantage of high 
spring flows. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
Petition to Parliament and Minutes of 
Gold Fields and Mines Committee 1919 
3.0 Petition to 1919 Goldfields and Mines 
Committee 
3.1 Transcript Committee Minutes 
Page No 
89 
92 
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GOLDFIELDS AND MINES COMMITTEE 
Mr Scott Chairman 
Wednesday, 15th October, 1919 
MINING BILL 
John Wilson, Farmer, Lauder, examined 
The Chairman: I will ask the clerk to read a petition to myself as member for 
Otago Central in connection with the Bill. 
The Petition was read by the Clerk as follows: 
COpy ONLY 
National Archives File LE/1/1919/4 
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To Robert Scott, Esq., M.P. 
Sir, we the undersigned irrigation right-holders in the Omaku, Lauder, and Matakanui 
districts earnestly desire you to protect our interests in the matter of clauses 
contained in the Mining Act Amendment Bill now or shortly to be considered by the 
House. 
The clauses which we consider to be unjust and detrimental to our interests are 
clauses 2 and 4, which provide for acquisition by the Crown of abandoned rights with 
all priority and rights whose time has expired. In most cases our rights are inferior 
rights and depend to a large extent on water from rights which have been practically 
abandoned. 
We would point out to you that from Chatto Creek, Thompson I s Gorge, and Lauder 
Gorge there are 77 heads of first rights, half of which are paper rights held by a 
syndicate in protection, looking forward to the time when clauses 3 and 4 will come 
into operation. It is quite unnecessary to point out to you their object. 
Further, our rights have been developed by miles of races to our properties at a large 
cost and the productiveness of our land will be seriously impaired should our races 
not be able to obtain their full right. 
We think it unjust that, having purchased these rights, many of which are of long 
standing, on the understanding that they were subsidiary only to mining rights the 
Crown should step in and acquire the rights referred to, our loss. You, sir, know the 
difference between rights held for mining and those held for irrigation, and it is 
unnecessary to prove to you that we obtain more water when prior rights are mining 
than we should be they were held for irrigation because of drainage, leakage, etc. 
We may say also that as more rights have been granted than the sources can supply 
in summer we do not even now obtain all the water for which we hold rights. 
We respectfully ask that you use every endeavour to have these clauses struck out or 
amended so that all rights acquired by the Crown or changed from mining to 
irrigation should not have priority to existing irrigation rights as it is obviously 
unjust to transfer a large first right originally granted for mining to an irrigation 
right with same priority. 
We are, Sir, 
Yours Respectfully, 
John Wilson, farmer, Lauder 
Sarah McGuckin, farmer, Omakau 
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Geo T Alexander, for J Alexander, farmer, Lauder 
H A Simes, farmer, Lauder 
Frank Donnelly, sheep farmer, Lauder 
A M Minehan, farmer, Drybread 
John Leancy, farmer, Om akau/fanner, Drybread 
o I Gordon Glassford, for L Gordon, Glassford 
Kellett and Muirhead, orchardists, Drybread 
R Brown, farmer, Lauder 
John Leask, farmer, Lauder 
James Clouston, farmer, Lauder 
Janet Clouston, farmer, Lauder 
T F Moran, farmer, Lauder 
D Moran, farmer, Lauder 
John R Clare, farmer, Omakau (representing Lauder Domain) 
Lena Stafford, farmer, Oamakau 
Robert Mee, farmer, Becks 
R S B Clarke, wool scourer, Omakau 
J Arnold, farmer, Omakau 
Patrick 0 'Dea, R. C. priest. 
92 
The Chairman: Have you any statement to make, Mr Wilson, in addition to what is 
contained in the petition? The petition pretty well represents the position, and I 
have come to answer any questions the Committee may wish to put to me. 
What is the extent of your water-races that you use for irrigation? - About 30 miles. 
Some of it, I suppose, is also used for stock? - Yes, and for domestic purposes. 
You think that if clause 2 passes it may put some of your rights in jeopardy? - Yes 
Will you explain why you think they won't be safe? - There are many old rights on 
paper that are not legitimately used, and we are using them for irrigation, and if the 
Government take them over and exercise the prior right we would have no water at 
all. 
Mr Poland: Are they on paper only? No one interfered with the miners as long as 
they were using the rights, but we understand now that the mining companies 
concerned are not paying and wish the Government to take them over. 
The Hon Sir W Fraser - Do you mean, the Government to purchase them ? Yes. 
The Chairman: How many heads of water have you rights for? For ten heads, at 
Lauder Gorge. 
Have you water from any other source? - Yes, but only tail water rights. 
You use the water the miners have used? Yes. My rights are inferior to the 
miners' . 
How long have you been using the water for irrigation?--- About thirty years. 
You were the first settler to irrigate? - Yes. I put in the first race. 
There are other settlers in the district besides yourself interested in the matter? 
Yes ; there are 23 in the petition. Others were not at home when the signatures 
were being taken. 
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They all take the same view as yourself? - Yes 
They are afraid this proposal will put them in a bad position if the old races are 
taken up? - Yes. It will ruin our work. We were satisfied while the mining was 
going on to use their surplus water and tail water, and now if the mining is given up 
our works will be useless unless we get protection. We do not want priority as long 
as they are using it for mining. 
Have you a change of purpose for all the water you use? - Yes, from mining to 
irrigation. 
The Hon Sir W Fraser: In the petition there is a remark that a certain syndicate 
holds water rights and that they are the active agents in promoting this clause. 
What ground have you for saying that? - All the waters on the Matakanui and 
Drybread, diggings which were con trolled by a large mining population in the early 
days have been transferred '?-I1d are now in the hands of one company. 
Which company is it? 
the old goldfields. 
The Tinkers Company. They control all the mining rights on 
And in the event of cancellation of forfeiture because they do not use their rights 
for mining purposes, would not those rights cease? - They won I t allow them to be 
cancelled. They would make a sale of it. 
Who would buy from them? - I understand there are people looking for them. 
Are you aware that according to the existing law nobody can get a transfer from a 
mining right to an irrigation right without the consent of the Minister of Mines? -
Yes, that is correct. 
And if the mining operations cease and the company could not use the water for 
mining, there is no more value in their race because the Crown won' t give them the 
right to transfer. There was one right transferred from mining to irrigation last 
court day. 
A warden cannot grant the transfer without the consent of the Crown. Do you know 
that is the law? - Yes. 
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How then could this syndicate expect to sell its rights? - A company went into 
liquidation recently, and the liquidator sold its shares to people for irrigation, and 
the matter was gratend in the Warden's Court. 
How could he do that? - An application was made for change of purpose, and there 
was no objection, and it was granted. 
You will find that the Warden has not the power without the consent of the 
Minister. I am telling you what happened. 
The object of our legislation is to prevent men who have held rights for a long time 
for a particular purpose from selling them as valuable rights for another purpose. 
The Crown did this for the protection of the settlers and to prevent monopoly. - I 
understand that, but I am telling you what happened. 
In this case the application would be granted subject to the consent of the Minister. 
I do not know whether that was inserted or not. I suppose if there was no objection 
the Minister could grant it if the Warden recommended favourably. 
It does not follow. - We get very shaky over using the water that we have been using 
for many years for irrigation for the development of the country. I am not fighting 
against the miner, but when the mining is absolutely done and the water has to be 
used for another purpose I say that the people who have used it for so long should 
have priority. I would not like to see the purpose of the water changed and the 
people who have been using it lose priority in irrigation. 
You say you have ten heads of water? - Yes, out of the Lauder Gorge. 
Is that a prior right for irrigation? - No, it is an inferior right to mining but first 
right in irrigation. 
You cannot mine with the water? - No, and we think that if the Government take 
over the rights from the company we may lose by it. 
What do you suppose the Government might take them over for? - They might take 
them over under an irrigation scheme. 
To supply the people with water? - Yes 
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And if the Government takes them over it is in the interests of the public? - Yes, 
but we want the existing irrigation rights protected. Our rights are especially 
valuable in the summer, when there is not much water available. 
How much water is there in the summer? - 1 have seen it down to ten or twelve 
heads in the creek, and in my race that has ten heads 1 have seen two or three heads. 
As long as the miners use the water you have not the right to ten heads or water, 
have you? - I understand the miners have the first right. They were first in the 
field. My argument however is that when the gold is not paying the water should 
revert to irrigation and those who have been using it for that purpose should have a 
prior right. 
I may say that the object of the proposed law is this: The Crown desires to hold the 
water when a change of purpose is necessary in order to see that no one person sball 
monopolise it. 
We say that the water should be let out for irrigation purposes to all and s\.U1dry to 
work their land and that it should not fall into the hands of monopolies. -1 thank you 
for the information. 
Mr Lee: At present you hold rights for irrigation purposes? - Yes 
And there are prior rights for mining purposes? - Yes 
If the water is not used for mining purposes and the preceeding certificates are 
cancelled you will obtain what you do not get now - your full quantity of water for 
irrigation purposes? - 1 am more likely to get it. 
If the Crown steps in and takes up the rights now granted for mining purposes and 
distributes the water for irrigation purposes it will use the whole quantity and 
deplete your supply? - Yes, it would leave us with no water and we would lose our 
existing rights. 
Mr T W Rhodes: You say that these rights are only paper rights. If you had brought 
an action for forfeiture would not your right have become paramo\.U1t? - Yes. 
It seems peculiar you did not do that? - The company has its rights protected. 
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No objection has been lodged? - No. As long as they are used for mining we get the 
water. 
Your fear is that the Crown will corne in and take up what you regard as your right? 
Yes. The whole thing is if the purpose of the rights is changed from mining to 
irrigation through the mines not paying, the existing irrigation right should be 
protected and have priority on account of having used the water for many years for 
irrigation. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
Water Allocation Plans: Prior Appropriation 
Vs Equal Sharing 
4.1 Opihi River Resource Allocation 
(Example of water sharing plan) 
4.2 Examples of conditions attached to 
licences by boards 
4.3 Example of Mining Privilege Water Race Right 
4.4 Example of Conditions attached to Mining 
Privilege Water Rights 
4.5 Priority Listing for Lindis River 
Page No 
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OPIHI RIVER WATER RESOURCE 
ALLOCATIONS 
(in m'/s) 
Rural T.C.C. Flow at Irrigation 
Total Water Supply Municipal Saleyards br Inslream 
Flow Schemes Supply "2 Uses l.P.I.S. Private 
1.5 0.36 0.14 1.0 1.0 0 0 
2.0 1.5 1.5 0 0 
2.5 2.0 2.0 0 0 "6 
2.6 2.1 1.6 0.5 0 
2.8 2.3 1.8 0.5 0 "5 
2.9 2,4 1.6 0.5 0.3 
1.5 3.0 2.2 0.5 0.3 "4 
36 3.1 1.37 1.13 0.6 
4.0 3.5 1.77 1.13 0.6 
4.5 4.0 2.27 1.13 0.6 
5.0 4.5 2.77 1.13 0.6 
55 5.0 3.27 1.13 0.6 '3 
5.6 5.1 2~12 1.98 1.0 
6.0 5.5 2.52 1.98 1.0 
6.5 60 3.02 1.98 10 
70 6.5 3.52 1.98 10 
15 70 4.02 1.98 1 0 
7.6 7.1 3.04 3.06 10 
8.0 7.5 3.44 3.06 10 
8.5 8.0 3.94 3.06 1.0 
9.0 8.5 4,44 3.06 10 
9.5 9.0 4.94 3.06 1.0 
10.0 9.5 5.44 3.06 1.0 
10.5 0.36 0.14 10.0 .. 1 5.94 3.06 1.0 
Notes: 
" Above 1 Om'/s diversion to out-of-river storages would be permitted, but controlled by conditions 
to the water right. 
'2 Public water supplies (municipal and stockwater) are in general abstracted upstream of Ihe 
Board's recorder stations at Cave. Rockwood and Skipton 
'3 'S' rights are suspended at 5.0m'/s. 
"4 'A' rights are halved at 3.0m'/s. 
"5 . All private water rights are suspended at 2.3mJ/s. 
"'6 All irrigation abstractions suspended at 2.0mJ/s. 
EXAMPLES OF~ATER RIGHTS 
I No.NCY 860282 
NORTH CANTERBURY CATCHMENT BOARD &:. REGIONAL WATER BOARD 
RIGHT IN RESPECT OF NATURAL WATER 
(pursuant to Sl!t:tion 2J(3}ofthl! Watulflld 
SaiJ CO~1'WIriQn Act 1967) 
THE NORTH CANTERBURY CATCHMENT BOARD. the RegionaJ Water Board for the North 
Canterbury Water Region, HEREBY GRANTS TO 
NAME HAMISH J. ANDERSON 
'ADDRESS Rotherham, R.D. 
THE RIGHT TO 
take up to 1300 cubic metres of water per day at a maximum rate of 30 
litres per second for 12 hours per day from a spring-fed tributary of Waiau 
River (locally known as Slaughterhouse Stream) at map reference S054:323613 
for spray irrigation of crops and pasture 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE. FOLLOWING PROPERTY 
LOCATION S.H. 70 near Greens Road, Rotherham 
LEGAL pt Lot 9 D.P. 2696 & Lot 1 D.P. 26139 
DESCRIPTION Block XVI. Lyndon Survey District 
TERM OF RI9HT 
COMMENCEMENT 1 September 1986 30 Apr; 1 1990 
CONDITIONS TO WHICH RIGHT IS SUBJECT 
(1) The grantee shall operate and maintain a suitable fish screen on the 
pump suction intake to the satisfaction of the Regional Water Board. 
(2) The grantee shall restrict or suspend the taking of water by direction 
of the Regional Water Board in accordance with the approved water 
allocation plan in the Waiau River. 
Note: The Water Allocation Plan minimum flows for the Waiau River at 
Marble Point are (in cubic metres per second); 
Jan Feb Mar Apr Hay June. July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
20 15 15 20 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
l~ued at Christchurch this 16th day of 
THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.Z. 
19 86 
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[ No. NCY 850419 
NORTH CANTERBURY CATCHMENT BOARD &. REGIONAL WATER BOARD 
RIGHT IN RESPECf OF NATURAL WATER 
(punuilnt to S~t:rion 21(3Joftht k'QIU anti 
Soil OmstfWItion Act 1967J 
THE NORTH CANTERBURY CATCHMENT BOARD. the Regional Water Board for the North 
CJnterbury Water Rettion, HEREBY GRANTS TO 
- .. 
NA.ME PETER LECLERC SQUIRES 
'ADDRESS Brookside, Leeston R.O. 
THE RIGHT TO 
.-
take up to 1000 cubic metres of water per day at a maximum rate of 15 litres 
per second from Boggy Creek at map raference S083:673354 for spl'"ay irrigation 
purposes 
IN CONNECT10N WITH THE. FOLLOWING PROPERTY 
.. 
LOCATION Brookside 
LEGAL R.S. 10792 
DESCR.Inl0N Block IX, Leeston Survey District 
, TERM OF RI<;:1HT 
COMMENCEMENT 1 October 1985 30 April 1989 
CONDITIONS TO WHICH RIGHT IS SUBJECT 
(a) the grantee shall operate and maintain a suitable fish screen on the pump 
suction intake to the satisfaction of the Regional Water Board. 
(b) that at Irwell-Rakaia Road the following minimum flow conditions are 
establ ished: 
(i) At flows greater than 150 litres per second - no restrictions on 
abstraction 
(ii) At flows greater than 60 litres per second and less than 150litres 
per second the follo\ving roster to apply. 
/' 
./ 
P.L. Squires to abstract from and including Sunday, to and 
including Wednesday of each week, and D.H. Green from and 
including Thursday, to and including Saturday of each week. 
(iii) At flows of 60 litres per second and less in Boggy Creek measured at 
Irwell-Rakaia Rd abstraction by all water right holders above C31dwel1< 
Road to cease. 
Issued at Christchurch this 15th day of £ber ! . .yI~ CRETAR 
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Licence No. 'O~l 
UndJ.OiAe Mining .Act IIJfS6- It9g 
LICENCE FOR. A WATER. RACE 
P . ,~ URSUANT to the Mining Act 4M, I the undersigned,.., _____ _ 
a Warden of the 
____ Q~h:& ___ .... 'i ..o----------Mining District, do hereby grant to 
(I) .., I) ,,'\ l\'~ na"idM....,.l~ at '-'o .. ...w • ftwW\8¥'; C~}orre. Sa ...... "'*' Of Lo",bu.1'!I\ ,Wido~; 
"X.a" ,J CfOMN.\ I Gcwcll!Mbt ; OM 1\..e ~r COIMQU10lt L 8"'(9-550 02 H.a. ~_o~ 
"L" r ·ft d' th F' S h d 1 h oV c..o""",.....:»ell this lcence lor a water r.ace, as speC! e In e lrst c e u e ereto. 
This Licence is granted for a term of 42 years, commencing on 
the date hereof, subject" to the terms, conditions, reservations, and provisions 
set out in the aforesaid Act, and the regulations thereunder, and also to such 
additional terms, conditions, reservations, and provisions as are specified in the 
Second Schedule hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto subscribed my name, and 
affixed the seal of the Warden's Court at c.rQrr\U~leJ\ 
this fou.rth day of Se.pt-£.!Mbe.r 1~02*, 
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OTAGO CATCHMENT BOARD 
RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO USE AND MAINTAIN 
AN EXPIRED MINING PRIVILEGE 
No: 2950B 
Pursuant to Section 24 (1) of the Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 
1971, the Otago Catchment Board, being the Regional Water Board for the 
Otago Catchment District, hereby grants to: 
Name: John Clement Anton Lucas 
Address: C/o Caudwells, P.O. Box 957, Dunedin 
the right to continue to use and maintain the race described in Licences 
Nos. 3137 and 4933, Cromwell Registry, for the purpose of the exercise of 
Right No. 2950A. 
Subject to the General Conditions set out below: 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
1. This right shall be deemed to confer upon the holder hereof the same 
rights, powers and duties as did the expired mining privilege in repla-
cement of which it has been granted; except where such rights, powers 
or duties may conflict with any other of the General Conditions listed 
below, or with any Special Condition of this Right. 
2. Grantee shall not alter the intake of the water, or use for diverting 
the water any race other than the race authorised by this Right. 
3. Grantee shall not have any right or remedy whatsoever against any per-
son in respect of the discharge of tailings, debris, refuse, or waste 
water into any watercourse by that person in the lawful carrying on of 
mining operations within the meaning of the Mining Act 1971. 
4. Grantee shall maintain in good repair, order, and condition, to the 
satisfaction of the Board, all bridges and culverts permitting public 
or private access over water races. 
Legal description of lands affected: Parts Run 237G BlOCKS IV, III and I 
Cluden Survey District. 
Special Condition: 
That grantee shall co-operate with the holder of Right No. 2958B in their 
use and maintenances of that part of the race granted by Licence No. 3137. 
This right will expire at 12 noon on 1 February 1996. 
Issued at Dunedin the 27th day of March 1986. 
R.W. SCOTT 
SECRETARY 
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PRIORITY LISTING 
LIND IS RIVER MINING PRIVILEGES 
WR7787/96Cr, 13.8.1986, 500,000 1.h -1, LineUs River, Crown, subject to Deed 
6179Cr; 
-1 WR801Cr, 11.10.1901,200,000 1.h ,Deep Creek, John Jenkins; 
WR1753Cr, 8.7.1905, 1,000,000 1.h -1 (but see Note 1), Linids River, Crown, extra 
water in WR7787/96Cr, subject to Deed 6179Cr; 
WR2708Cr, 9.9.1909, 1,200,000 1.h-t, Linids River, John Alexander Lethbridge 1.4, 
Edna May Lethbridge 1/4, Alistair Askin Rutherford 1/4, Suzanne Elizabeth 
Rutherford 1/4, was subject to Deed 8050Cr; 
-1 WR2709,Cr, 9.9.1909, 200,000 l.h ,Waiwera Stream, John Alexander Lethbridge 
and Others (as for WR2708Cr, above); 
WR2802Cr, 10.2.1910, 5,000,000 l.h -1, Lindis River, Crown, was affected by Deed 
8050Cr; 
-1 WR2812Cr, 10.3.1910, 400,000 l.h I Wanui Stream, Crown 1/2, Donald Alan Young 
1/2; 
WR2873Cr, 16.6.1920, 350,000 l.h -1 Lindis River, Ardgour Run Ltd; 
108 
WR3078Cr, 26.8.1911, 200,000 1.h -l, Long Spur Creek, Brian Alexander McCaughan; 
WR3079Cr, 26.8.1911, 200,000 1.h -1 Little Rocky Hill Creek, Brian Alexander 
McCaughan; 
WR3080Cr, 26.8.1911, 600,000 1.h -l, Lindis River, John Clement Anton 3/5, Peter 
Coven Heath Davis 1/5, John Davis Ltmn Davis 1/5; 
-1 WR3137Cr, 11.11.1911, 300,000 1.h ,Cluden Stream, John Clement Anton Lucas 
11/12, Peter Coven Heath David 1/24, John Davis Lunn Davis 1/24; 
WR3448Cr 2.8.1914, 200,000 1.h-1, Timbum, Peter Coven Heath Davis, John Davis 
Lunn Davis 112; 
WR3587Cr, 2.8.1916, 200,000 1.h - \ McKenzie I s Creek, William Raymond Patterson; 
-1 WR3665Cr, 4.7.1917, 300,000 1.h ,Wanui Stream, Peter Lyall Anderson 1/3, Janet 
Ellen Anderson 1/3, Trust (Janet Ellen Anderson, Leslie James William Stewart, 
Roger Norman Macassey) 1/3; 
WR3757Cr, 11.9.1918, 50,000 1.h-1 Eight Mile Creek, James Gordon Lucas; 
WR3805Cr, 20.6.1919, 100,000 1.h-l, Nine Mile Creek, James Gordon Lucas 3/5 
Hazel Edith Lucas 1/5, Robert Cameron White 1/5; 
WR4083Cr, 22.3.1922, 600,000 1.h-l, Lindis River, Crown; 
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WR4836Cr, 11.5.1927, 400,000 1.h-l, Tributary of Tarras Creek, Crown 
WR4837Cr, 11.5.1927,600,000 1.h-1, Tributary of Tarras Creek, Crown; 
WR5083Cr, 7.8.1929,200,000 1.h-1, Timburn, Peter Coven Heath Davis, John Davis 
Lunn Davis 1/2; 
WR5950Cr, 7.3.1934, 400,000 l.h-l, Station Creek, Russell Stewart Emmerson; 
-1 WR8546Cr, 7.12.1955, 100,000 1.h ,Shepherds Creek, Ardgour Run Ltd. 
The above list is in order of priority. 
Omitted from the list are two takings of water (from springs) claimed by notice 
under s.21(2) to be lawful under the Public Works Act 1928. The priority of such uses 
would presumably date from the promulgation of the appropriate Order-in-Council. 
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5.0 Research Method 
The first step in the study was to establish an analytical framework. Initially, 
contemporary economic theory of transferable property rights to water was 
reviewed. Next the property rights structure governing the use of water under the 
mining privilege system, and how the structure changed over time was examined. 
The economic theory highlighted the conditions under which a water market was 
likely to operate efficiently. Detailing the mining privilege property rights structure 
established whether efficiency conditions were present, delimited individual choice 
domains, and hence the opportunity set for water resource use decisions. 
Having established a theoretical framework the method of rational reconstruction 
was used to predict outcomes in terms of the externalities, transactions costs, equity 
and efficiency of the mining privilege system. The method of rational 
reconstruction is based on the premise that individuals act rationally in response to 
constraints, opportunities and incentive structures they confront. It was assumed 
the common denominator of individual choice domains was personal gain, and that 
this took precedence over other motivating factors. Thus, to act rationally was to 
act in a manner which maximised personal gain. Although this is a narrow definition 
of rationally it was thought to be appropriate to the research context. In an 
environment where water had a high scarcity value actors were faced with making 
substantial economic decisions; personal gain would have ranked high on their agenda. 
112 
Having formulated a series of predicted outcomes, evidence was sought to either 
support or refute these conjectures. As many different data sources as possible were 
used. Both qualitative and quantitative data was examined. The study was not a 
static step by step process. Rather the theoretical framework used and the research 
findings were continually modified or adapted by reintroducing data obtained in later 
steps to earlier steps. This iterative and adaptive process continued until no 
significant alterations to findings emerged. An outline of the research method, 
sources of data used and the people interviewed in the study are recorded below. 
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5.1 Sketch of Research Method Final Report 
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5.2 Data Sources 
National Achive Material: Petitions to and minutes of the Goldfields and Mines 
Committee 1898-1919. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 1898-1919. New 
Zealand Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives 1098-1919. 
Wardens Court Case History. Hocken Library. Historical literature relating to early 
Otago. 
Contemporary theory on transferable property rights to water and general property 
right literature. Interviews with people, as listed below. 
5.3 People Interviewed 
Euan Carr 
Kevin Carry 
Ron Division 
Lloyd Hinchy 
Bruce Greer 
Terry Hearn 
Gavin Herlihy 
Farmer, entrepreneur and private water right holder, Patearoa, 
Central Otago; 
Director, Otago Catchment Board, Thmedin 
Fanner , private water right holder and Chainnan Vincent City 
Council, Central Otago, Tarras. 
Fanner, private water right holder and Otago Catchment Board 
member. Now retired. Alexandra, Central Otago. 
Fanner, Chairman of the Otgao Private Water Right Holders 
Association. Retired fanner, Pateroa, Central Otago. 
Lecturer Extension Studies, University of Otago. Historian and 
geographer with expertise in early Central Otago history. 
Fanner, Patearoa, Central Otago. MSc Agriculture Science. 
Roy Ferrans 
Brian Mooney 
Ian Keynes 
Hank Stocker 
115 
Otago Catchment Board staff member, administers mining 
privileges. 
Otago Catchment Board staff member, administers mining 
privileges. 
Manager of Resources and Planning Hawkes Bay Catchment 
Board. 
District Soil and Conservation Officer. Ministry of Works and 
Development, Central Otago. 
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WATER TRANSFERS: EFFICIENCY CONDmONS 
The creation of binding flow constraints has important implications for the 
efficiency conditions for water resource allocation. These are be explored here with 
the use of a simple model. 1 hnagine a stream which has a flow at the source of S 
units of water per unit time. If the amount of water user i diverts is denoted by Si 
and the ith. users return flow is Ri, then (l-Ri)Si represents the ith abstractors 
consumptive use. Now assume a flow of S must exist at some downstream point. 
The maximum volume of water available for appropriation by n users sequentially 
located along the stream is the difference between'S and S. The minimum flow 
requirement could reflect the amount needed by an existing appropriator or 
alternatively an instream right. 
Now assume for each of the n users there exists a function, Fi (Si), representing the 
marginal product of water diverted. Further assume that the cost of diversion Ci, 
the purchase of pumps and the construction and maintenance of other devices, is a 
function of the volume of water diverted. Thus the net value of the marginal 
product of water diverted is: 
(1) NVMP Fi (Si) - C (Si) i = 1, 2, ... n 
If we assume the water course is fully appropriated the resource use optimisation 
problem becomes one of maximising: 
1 The model developed here is based on one used by Johnson, et. a.. (1981) 
The Definition of A Surface Water Right and Transferability in the Journal of 
Law and Economics 24: 273-88. 
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Subject to S()I 0 and 
. "-(2) Sn ,( S (1-R1) S1 - (1-R2) S2 ...... (l-Rn-l) Sn-l 
- "-S {. S - (1-R1) Sl (1-R2) S2 ....... (l-Rn) Sn 
The flow constraints i = 1 ...... n represent the requirement that flow at any point of 
diversion is not less than the amount diverted. The final constraint represents 
-requirement of the instream appropriation S, further downstream. The probability 
that any of the n flow constraints is binding will in part be dependant on the relative 
- " '" -sizes of S and S. If the river flow between S and S is large relative to diversion none 
of the n constraints need to be binding. 21 In this case if we employ the appropriate 
Lagrangian equation; 
the optimum solution yields: 
(4) [Fi (Si )-Ci (Si )]/(l-Ri ) = ..\ c , i = 1, 2, 3 -- n. 
Equation (4) reveals that if total value is to be maximised along the stream the value 
of the net marginal product of consumptive use22 must be equal across all users. 
This is the traditional micro economic equilibrium condition for efficient resource 
allocation. 
21 Ibid P. 287 
22 Dividing the net value of the marginal product of water, F[(S.:J-CL(S,:)by the 
fraction consumed, (I-K[) transforms it into the net marginal product of 
consumptive use. 
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POSTSCRIPT 604 5/11/88 
1.0 Introduction 
This postscl-ipt is a cl-itical appraisal of my 604 that was 
completed in February 1988. The appraisal begins by 
assessing the theoretical approach I used. A critical review 
is then made of the project's content, structure and research 
method. 
1.1 Theoretical Approach 
Propel-ty theory 
institutional analysis. 
of transaction costs 
means of assessing the 
formed the basis of my comparative 
This theory recognises the existence 
and extel-nalities, thus pcoviding a 
effects of different institutional 
arrangements on resource allocation. Thi overcomes a 
significant limitation of the neoclassical economics model 
that assumes externalities and transaction costs are zero 
thus, yielding an efficient resource allocation for any 
arrangement of property rights. I used transaction cost 
analysis to assess alternative property right arrangements to 
water and to predict outcomes of the Otago water market. 
Transaction costs are only one of many criteria that can be 
used to compare alternative institutional arrangements. As a 
criteria, transaction costs were an inadequate tool to 
examine the nature of and rationale for government's 
involvement in allocating water resources (i.e. the final 
section of the report). For this section of the analysis, I 
relied on the knowledge I had acquired in Natural Resource 
Policy 621. Thus in my assessment of government's role, I 
used equity and efficiency criteria and concepts such as the 
"free rider", public goods and the distribution of costs and 
benefits between key actors competing for water resources. 
In retrospect, the use of additional criteria such as 
contestability, transactions frequency, accountability, 
propensity for error correction and transparency would have 
resulted in a more comprehensive analysis. 
1.2 Critique of Content/structure 
The critique below is divided into three parts, each 
examining one of the three main sections of my report. 
1.2.1 Water Transfers: Contemporary Theory 
This section of the report presents a comprehensive review of 
contemporary theory relating to transferable water rights as 
will as a critique of how water rights have been delimited 
and allocated in New Zealand. 
On page 5 the statement that " property rights to water can 
be specified in a manner which internalises costs and 
benefits, minimises costs of specification and enforcement, 
and thus ensures transaction costs are kept to a minimum" is 
inconsistent with my analysis. The method of transferring 
water rights will also influence transaction costs, for 
example, whether transfers are a purely between private 
individuals or are overseen by a public body. Furthermore, 
different property right arrangements will generate different 
transaction costs as they influence risks associated with 
appropriability i.e. the certainty that an actor will capture 
the intended benefits from a water right transfer. 
Minimising specification and enforcement costs will not 
necessarily increase certainty that the intended benefits of 
a transfer will be realised. My analysis examined the effect 
of uncertainty on transaction costs on page 7. The statement 
on page 5 is inconsistent with my analysis. 
1.2.2 The Mining 
economic analysis 
Privilege System of Water Allocation: An 
This section 
Otago water 
situation is 
is a summary 
market. 
of my research findings on the 
The complete analysis of the Otago 
in the first three appendices of the contained 
report. Most of it is original 
studied the early Otago water market 
research as no one had 
in any detail. The 
results were applied towards an understanding of how a water 
market in New Zealand could be organised. The generalised 
application of the Otago study fulfilled the requirements of 
my research contract with Treasury. An alternative, more 
focused, use of the research findings, would be as a case 
study to evaluate the accuracy of contemporary theoretical 
models of water market behaviour. The data clearly supports 
several predictions made by water market models. 
1.2.3 A Market For Water In New Zealand 
Shortcomings of this section of the 
discussion of suggested improvements, 
report, along with a 
are listed below. 
-In my discussion of the initial allocation of water 
rights (P. 36 and 37) it would have been an appropriate place 
to raise the prospect of Maori ownership, rather than later 
in the report. This is a matter of report structure. 
The Central Districts Catchment Boards have decided to grant 
an increased minimum flow II in recognition of the spiritual, 
cultural and traditional fishing value of the Wanganui River 
to the IcJanganu i Maor i ... " (Wanganu i 
1988, P. 22). The Te Tikanga Tribal 
Minimum Flow Review, 
Authority responded by 
attempting to collect a rental from jet boat operators and 
canoeists (Christchurch Press 12/11/SS). This demonstrates 
Maoris are willing to trade water rights. Information of 
this nature, at the time of writing, would have enhanced my 
brief discussion of Waitangi Treaty issues. 
-On page 41 I discuss the Crm-Ins "monopo I y advantage" in 
supplying water. "Monopoly advantage" infers the Crown is 
able to manipulate prices because of the size of its market 
share. I related monopoly advantage to the nature of the 
Crown's transaction costs. This is a very dubious 
suggestion. The report provides no clear argument to support 
the suggestion that transaction costs will affect market 
advantage. The paragraph concerned could removed without any 
further alterations to the report. 
-On page 43 I 
used as a measure 
concluded that "lrlhe,-e consumptive use is 
of transferability. an objection process 
need not constrain transfers. This is an optimistic 
statement. The potential for objections to arise will depend 
not only on the nature of the property rights being 
reassigned, but also on hearing procedures, rights of 
standing; and individual and institutional agendas, both open 
and hidden; that may appear to have little obvious relation 
to the proposed exchange of property rIghts. A more 
appropriate conclusion is that delimiting rights on the basis 
of consumption 
transfers. 
the likelihood of objections to 
-My for national rather than regional 
management and allocation of instream rights would have been 
strengthened by reference to Gresham' law of regulatory 
laxity. Rowland and Marz (1982) argue that locating 
-func t ions )-egiona11y 
between different jurisdictions 
e>:istence of instream l-ights \l'lo~_lld 
consumptive rights and hence raise 
market. Industries would take the 
when making location decisions. 
may 
to 
encourage competition 
attract industry. The 
diminish the supply of 
the price of water on the 
then view instream rights as having 
terms of regional employment and 
quantity of such rights. 
price ,-ise into account 
Regional authorities may 
an opportunity cost in 
respond by reducing the 
-I suggested that the Department of Conservation could 
manage instream rights and that this may present problems of 
accountab iii ty (P. 45 46) • I could have suggested 
accountability would be strengthened 
rights to both the Department of 
Acclimatisation Society. Allocating 
Acclimatisation Society would 
public participation. 
open up 
by allocating instream 
Conservation and the 
water rights to the 
further avenues for 
1.3 Research Method 
The basis of 
reconstruction". 
my 
This 
research method was 
assumed participants in 
"rational 
the water 
market would act in an economically rational manner, using 
personal economic gain as the criteria for most decisions. 
Given the constraints and opportunities faced by actors in 
the water market, predictions about market outcomes were then 
"rationally constructed". I originally defended the use of 
the "self -maximising" assumption by identifying the 
potentially enormous economic gain for individuals from 
exchanges of water (P. 111). I now realise that a better 
defence of my research method is possible. 
A common criticism of the model of rational economic man is 
that people are 
(1982) suggests 
not self-interested ma~imisers. Otway 
people act rationally in as far as they act 
in accordance with their beliefs and values to achieve their 
goals. Viewed in this way, lI'economic rationality" is a 
subset of Otway's definition of rational behaviour. To act 
in an economically rational manner does not automatically 
imply people are innately self interested. What appears as 
rational economic behaviour may simply be the result of 
people acting in accordance with their beliefs. 
The beliefs and rules with which we structure social 
behaviour can loosely be termed institutional arrangements. 
In turn, the behaviour of rational economic man can be viewed 
as being specific to a particular institutional arrangement. 
Thus, the validity of my research method is nat dependent on 
my assumption that individuals are self maximisers. The 
"nature" of man is redundant to the analysis. The method 
used was appropriate to the institutional context- a water 
market. 
1.4 Conclusion 
r'1y theol-etical 
right theory and 
allocation of 
apPl-oach 
the role 
was dominated by private property 
transaction costs play in the 
useful tool with which to 
Tl-ansaction cost analysis i'las a 
assess different arrangements of 
property rights theory was not 
rationale for and the nature of 
water rights. However, 
adequate to examine the 
governments involvement 
other theories, such as 
in allocating 
Gresham's law, 
water. The use of 
and criteria such as 
accountability, could have strengthened t~e analysis of 
government's role in allocating water. Finally I have argued 
that the assumption underpinning my research method, that 
individuals are rational self-maximisers, was unnecessary. 
Although the 60~ project has several important shortcomings, 
given the chance to rewrite it, I would not change the basic 
thrust of my argument. 
would be provided by 
rights. However, the 
I still believe considerable benefits 
allov'ling 
nature of 
trade in consumptive water 
Central/Local Government's 
role in 
ownel-sh ip 
all oc a t i ng instream flows, 
issues 
the question of Maori 
need more thorough and accountability 
analysis than is presented in my 604 project. 
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